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THE "ART" OF INHERITANCE: A PROPOSAL
FOR LEGISLATION REQUIRING PROOF OF
PARENTAL INTENT BEFORE
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
CAN INHERIT FROM A DECEASED PARENT'S
ESTATE
Perhaps the most importantarea of legal inquiry today is the
interactionbetween law and technology, for it is at this point
that law either becomes a toolfor shaping the future or an
obsolete inconvenience circumvented by increasing
technological innovation....
The development of modern
reproductive technology and its widespreadavailability
present an important challenge to the law of inheritance:
change with technology or pass into obsolescence.'
I. INTRODUCrION

John and Mary, his second wife, intended to have children, but they
had not yet conceived a child when John was diagnosed with cancer.
John and Mary decided to have some of John's sperm frozen in fear that
the chemotherapy he was undergoing would render him infertile. John's
health quickly deteriorated, and he died before Mary could be
impregnated with his cryopreserved sperm. Almost twenty-seven
months later, Mary successfully conceived a child through in vitro
fertilization using John's frozen sperm. Sarah, the biological child of
John and Mary, was born nearly three years after the death of her father.
Nathan and Emily, John's children from his first marriage, were
concerned that this new child would result in the dilution of their shares
of their father's estate. Nathan and Emily filed suit, arguing that Sarah
should not be entitled to a portion of John's estate because he did not
intend for her to be conceived and because she was born more than nine
2
months after his death.

1

James E. Bailey, An Analytical Frameworkfor Resolving the Issues Raised by the Interaction
Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance,47 DEPAUL L. REv. 743, 744-45
(1998).
2
See infra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the nine-month
period).
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Sarah was conceived through modern artificial reproductive
technologies ("ARTs"). 3 These technologies may now result in children
being conceived long after their parents' deaths and also raise many
4
issues, including property rights in reproductive materials and
government benefits and entitlements.5 However, the scope of this Note
is limited to examining the impact of ARTs on the law of inheritance.
Because states have an interest both in carrying out the wishes of the
deceased and in the timely settlement of the deceased's estate, the idea of
a posthumously conceived child 6 claiming a share of the deceased
parent's estate potentially compromises the interests of the other parties
involved in the administration of the estate. Given that posthumous
conception is a present reality - both in feasibility and practice - courts
must be prepared to address the competing claims that will arise in the
context of estate administration.
This Note will address two issues that should be considered in
determining whether a posthumously conceived child is a child of the
deceased parent for purposes of inheritance: (1) intent-whether the
father knowingly agreed to the conception of a child with his sperm after
his death, and (2) time -whether a period of limitations for filing a claim

3
For a discussion of modern reproductive technologies, see infra Part ILA.
4
For a brief discussion of the property interest in reproductive materials, see infra notes
88-96 and accompanying text; see also Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 280-81
(Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that the argument raised by the decedent's children that the
decedent had no ownership or possessory interest in his sperm once it left his body was
"self-defeating"); Andrea Corvalan, Comment, Fatherhood After Death: A Legal and Ethical
Analysis of Posthumous Reproduction, 7 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 335, 338-39 (1997) (discussing
the impact of classifying reproductive materials as property, capable of being bequeathed,
because otherwise a donor's interest in his sperm would remain with him and
consequently die with him). Hecht was the first, and is currently the only, case to address
the question whether gametes could be bequeathed. Bailey, supra note 1, at 748.
5
According to the Social Security Administration's ("SSA") regulations:
To decide whether you have inheritance rights as the natural child of
the insured, we use the law on inheritance rights that the State courts
would use to decide whether you could inherit a child's share of the
insured's personal property if the insured were to die without leaving
a will.
20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(1) (2003). For a discussion of whether social security survivor's
benefits should be made available to posthumously conceived children, see generally
Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and NontraditionalConceptions: Social Security Survivor's
Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 251 (1999).
6
A "posthumously conceived child" is "a child [conceived] after the death of one or
both of the biological parents." Cindy L. Steeb, Note, A Child Conceived After His Father's
Death?: Posthumous Reproduction and Inheritance Rights. An Analysis of Ohio Statutes, 48
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 141 (2000).
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against the estate should be imposed on the child.7 Part II briefly
describes the current ARTs that have led to this controversy and
provides an overview of inheritance rights for children.8 Part III presents
the problems with the current status of the law regarding the rights of
posthumously conceived children in light of developing reproductive
technologies. 9 Part IV proposes an amendment to the Uniform Probate
Code ("UPC") as a possible solution to the controversy. 10
II. BACKGROUND

Understanding the need for inheritance laws that not only embrace
current ARTs but also are flexible enough to accommodate future ARTs
requires an explanation of the existing ARTs, as well as an overview of
how inheritance rights historically developed with respect to children
who have been adopted, born out of wedlock, posthumously born, or
posthumously conceived.
A.

CurrentARTs

ARTs assist infertile couples in conceiving through noncoital
methods, which are methods that do not involve sexual intercourse."
The oldest of these methods is artificial insemination ("AI"). 12 AI
involves artificially inserting sperm either into the vagina, into the
cervical canal, or directly into the uterus.13 The seminal fluid may be
drawn
from
the woman's husband
(artificial insemination
homologous - "AIH"),
from
a donor
(artificial insemination
heterologous -"AID"), or from a combination of the husband and donor

7
Because current case law only addresses posthumous conception with cryopreserved
sperm, much of this Note will focus on children conceived posthumous to their fathers'
deaths. However, children may also be conceived from cryopreserved ova, or eggs, after
their mothers' deaths, and the standards should be the same.
8
See infra Part II.
9
See infra Part III.
10

See infra Part IV.

Laurence C. Nolan, Posthumous Conception: A Private or Public Matter?, 11 BYU J. PUB.
L. 1, 3 (1997).
12 Steeb, supra note 6, at 139-40. Al has been performed on animals for centuries. E.
Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem
Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 234 (1986). The first successful Al occurred in the
fourteenth century when the semen of a stallion was used to impregnate an Arab mare. Id.
The first successful human Al was performed in England in 1770. Id.
13 Christine A. Djalleta, Comment, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: ProposedAmendments to
the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEM4P. L. REV. 335, 337
(1994).
11
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(combined artificial insemination -"CAI").14 The sperm may be inserted
into the woman immediately, or it may be frozen and used for Al up to
ten years later.'5 Long viability periods for reproductive material
increase the chance that conception could occur many years after the
donor's death.' 6 On average, seven insemination attempts over 4.4
menstrual cycles are required to establish pregnancy.' 7 Only about 40%
of patients successfully become pregnant through A1. 18
A more expensive and less successful method is in vitro fertilization
("IVF"), the procedure by which eggs are removed from a woman's
ovaries and fertilized with sperm outside her body.' 9 The ova may be
from the mother or from a donor and may be fertilized with fresh or
The resulting "preembryos" are then
previously frozen sperm.2°
21
implanted in the mother's womb or frozen for later use.

Id. at 337. The donor in AID is usually a man who is compensated for making a sperm
deposit. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 12, at 236; see also Ronald Chester, Freezing the
Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance,
33 Hous. L. REV. 967, 976 & n.38 (1996).
15
Djalleta, supra note 13, at 337. Sperm is frozen and stored in a nitrogen-filled tank at
-328' Fahrenheit. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 12, at 234.
16
Amy L. Komoroski, Comment, After Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Services
[sic]: ihere Do Posthumously Conceived Children Stand in the Line of Descent?, 11 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 297, 303 (2002). The viability of frozen sperm varies, depending on the treatment it
receives. Id. at 302-03. For a discussion of the viability of cryopreserved sperm and eggs,
see Bailey, supra note 1, at 818.
17
Monica Shah, Comment, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concerning
Cryopreservationand Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 549 (1996).
18
Id. Of the more than 20,000 babies born by Al in the United States each year,
approximately 1,500 are born to unmarried women. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 12,
at 241; see also Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98
HARV. L. REV. 669, 671 (1985).
19 Djalleta, supra note 13, at 337. This method is generally used when the egg is
prevented from passing through the fallopian tubes because the oviducts are blocked.
14

ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES,

AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 87 (1995). Louise Brown, the first baby conceived by means of
IVF, was born in England in July, 1978. Id. at 89. The first baby conceived in the United
States by means of IVF, Elizabeth Car, was born on December 28, 1981. Id. In 2000, the
combined pregnancy success rates for IVF, GIFT, and ZIFT were as follows: 37.6% of
women under the age of thirty-five, 32.2% of women thirty-five to thirty-seven years old,
24.6% of women thirty-eight to forty years old, and 16.0% of women greater than forty-one
years old. National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, 2000
Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates, at http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/artOO/nationO0.
asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
Djalleta, supra note 13, at 338.
20
21

Id.
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22
One variation of IVF is gamete intrafallopian transfer ("GIFT").
GIFT involves the separate transfer of sperm and unfertilized eggs into
the fallopian tubes. 23 This method differs from regular IVF procedures
because fertilization occurs inside the body rather than inside a petri
dish. 24
Another variation, zygote intrafallopian transfer ("ZIFT"),
involves placing the embryo via catheter into the fallopian tube about
eighteen hours after fertilization. 25 Both variations may use donor ova
and sperm as well as cryopreserved embryos. 26 IVF and its variations
allow for the possibility of conception after the death of the father or
27
mother.

Surrogacy is another possible method of reproduction. 28 In the
simplest case, an unmarried surrogate mother is impregnated with the
sperm and egg of a married couple. 29 A second alternative is for an
unmarried surrogate mother to be inseminated with sperm from the
father or a donor.3° A third option is for a married couple to contract
with a married surrogate to undergo implantation of donated sperm and
eggs. 31 As with Al, IVE,and their variations, frozen sperm or ova may

22 BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 19, at 87; see also Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and
the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
497,498 n.6 (1996).
23 BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 19, at 87; see also Elizabeth Price Foley, Human Cloning
and the Right to Reproduce, 65 ALB. L. REV. 625, 631 n.45 (2002).
24
BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 19, at 87.
25
Id.; see also Foley, supranote 23, at 631 n,46.
26
BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 19, at 87.
27
Komoroski, supra note 16, at 303.
28
Djalleta, supra note 13, at 339. In such arrangements, there may be as many as six
individuals who qualify as the parents of the resulting child. Paula Roberts, Biology and
Beyond: The Casefor Passageof the New Uniform ParentageAct, 35 FAM. L.Q. 41,48 (2001).
29
Id. In this case, the identity of the father is unequivocal because the surrogate is
unmarried. Id. Thus, the natural father may easily establish his paternity either through
(1) acknowledgment, an agreement with the surrogate, or (2) a lawsuit if the surrogate
changes her mind and wishes to keep the child as her own. Id. However, the child has two
potential mothers: the wife who is the natural mother and the surrogate who gives birth.
Id. Most states declare the natural mother to be the legal mother. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 535/12(9) (2000) ("[Tlhe names of the biological mother and biological father.., shall
be entered on the child's birth certificate, and the names of the surrogate mother and
surrogate mother's husband, if any, shall not be on the birth certificate.").
30
Djalleta, supra note 13, at 339. Here, the child has four potential parents: the natural
father, the sperm donor if one exists, the natural mother, and the surrogate mother. See
Roberts, supra note 28, at 48.
31
Roberts, supra note 28, at 49. In this more complicated scenario, there are three
potential mothers (wife, surrogate, and egg donor) and three potential fathers (husband,
surrogate's husband, and sperm donor). Id. Presumptions of paternity in these situations
exist in some states. Id.
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be used in surrogacy, which provides the opportunity for posthumous
conception.
Because ARTs allow for the possibility of conception after the death
of the father or mother, thus increasing the number of children who
could qualify as takers under state laws of inheritance, the impact of
ARTs on the laws of inheritance is unavoidable. Before analyzing how
the laws of inheritance should be amended to respond to ARTs, an
overview of the evolution of inheritance rights in children is provided.
B.

Transfers to Children

Children, like adults, may receive property from their parents upon
the parents' deaths through testamentary transfer, intestate succession,
or non-probate transfers such as trusts and life insurance. 32 What the
child takes upon the death of the parent is relatively clear when the child
is a natural child born during the lives of both natural parents. 33 The
child may take under the parent's will or under state pretermission
statutes, which provide for children either born after a parent's death or
unintentionally left out of a will. 34 In the absence of a will, the default
35
rules of intestate succession apply.

32 For a brief history of estate administration, see Sarajane Love, Estate Creditors, the
Constitution, and the Uniform Probate Code, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 411, 415-25 (1996). There are
three major functions of probate, which is the administration of the decedent's estate: (1) to
provide evidence of transfer of title, (2) to protect creditors by requiring payment of debts,
and (3) to distribute the decedent's property according to his or her intent. JESSE
DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 39 (6th ed. 2000).
33 See Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigmof Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 206
(2001).
34 See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
35 Foster, supra note 33, at 206. People may choose not to make a will because they
cannot face the fact of their own deaths or the cost involved. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON,
supra note 32, at 71. State laws of descent and distribution govern the distribution of the
property of the person who dies intestate. Id. at 72. Generally, the disposition of the
decedent's personal property is governed by the law of the state where the decedent was
domiciled at death, and the disposition of the decedent's real property is governed by the
law of the state where such real property is located. Id. The UPC, originally promulgated
in 1969 and revised in 1993, is a model code that states can choose to adopt or can use in
organizing their own probate codes. Id. at 40. The portion of the code relating to intestacy,
found in Article II, is as follows:
(a) Any part of a decedent's estate not effectively disposed of by will
passes by intestate succession to the decedent's heirs as prescribed in
this Code, except as modified by the decedent's will.
(b) A decedent by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an
individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by
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However, "[o]ne of the increasingly notable shortcomings of modern
probate law is its failure to provide adequate guidelines governing the
36
inheritance rights of children outside the traditional nuclear family."
Despite a lack of clarity, with the passage of time and the evolution of
the law, adopted children, children born out of wedlock, and children
conceived before but born after the death of one or more of the natural
parents have all received recognition as "children" who have inheritance
37
rights to their parents' property.
1.

Adopted Children

Inheritance rights of adopted children vary by state. In some states,
adopted children can inherit only from their adoptive parents and
relatives within the adoptive family. 38 In others, adopted children can
inherit from both their adoptive and natural parents and relatives within
both families.39 In still others, where the adoption is by the spouse of a

intestate succession. If that individual or a member of that class
survives the decedent, the share of the decedent's intestate estate to
which that individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that
individual or each member of that class had disclaimed his [or her]
intestate share.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (amended 1993), 8.1 U.L.A. 79-80 (2001).
36
Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 93, 94 (1996).
37
See infra Part I.B.1-3.
38 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-207 (2001). For purposes of inheritance:
[amn adopted child shall be treated as a natural child of his [or her]
adopting parent or parents. On adoption, a child no longer shall be
considered a child of either natural parent, except that upon adoption
by the spouse of a natural parent, the child shall still be considered the
child of that natural parent.
Id. § 1-207(a); see also Hall v. Vallandingham, 540 A.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988) (holding that the adopted child's right to inherit from his or her natural parents is
eliminated upon adoption).
39 See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (Vernon 2003). For purposes of inheritance:
an adopted child shall be regarded as the child of the parent or parents
by adoption, such adopted child and its descendants inheriting from
and through the parent or parents by adoption and their kin the same
as if such child were the natural child of such parent or parents by
adoption, and such parent or parents by adoption and their kin
inheriting from and through such adopted child the same as if such
child were the natural child of such parent or parents by adoption.
The natural parent or parents of such child and their kin shall not
inherit from or through said child, but said child shall inherit from and
through its natural parent or parents.
Id.; see also Hamilton v. Butler, 397 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (awarding the
adopted granddaughter of the intestate decedent the entirety of his estate over his blood-
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natural parent, the child's inheritance rights continue in both the natural
parents as well as the adoptive parent. 4° Furthermore, adopted children
are considered brothers and sisters of their adopting parents' natural
children for purposes of intestate succession to the estate of the natural
41
child or children of the adopting parents.
The state of Washington follows the view that adopted children
should inherit only from their adoptive parents and the adoptive
parents' relatives. In In re Estates of Donnelly,42 the trial court held that a
child could inherit from her natural grandfather through her deceased
natural father, even though the child had been adopted by her mother's
new husband. 43 The appellate court affirmed that decision, finding no
ambiguity in the statute and "no explicitly expressed intent to deprive an
44
adopted child [her] right to inherit from [her] intestate grandparent."
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the decision of the trial

related nieces and nephews because the law gave the adopted child the same right to
inherit from her adoptive parents as that of a natural child, and she was the only
grandchild of the decedent).
40
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b), 8.1. U.L.A. 91. For purposes of inheritance:
[a]n adopted individual is the child of his [or her] adopting parent or
parents and not of his [or her] natural parents, but adoption of a child
by the spouse of either natural parent has no effect on (i) the
relationship between the child and that natural parent or (ii) the right
of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit from or through the
other natural parent.
Id. (second and third alterations in original); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-114(b) (Michie
1995) (adopting a provision similar to UPC section 2-114(b)).
41
Estate of Kuhn v. Kuhn, 267 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ind.Ct. App. 1971). Prior to the revision
of the probate code, the Indiana courts held that adopted children could not inherit from
the adopting parents' natural children. Jacobs v. Schulmeyer, 70 N.E.2d 435, 435 (Ind.Ct.
App. 1947). In 1953, however, the legislature altered the code so that adopted children
could inherit from their stepbrothers and stepsisters. Id. IND. CODE § 29-1-2-8 (1953).
42
502 P.2d 1163 (Wash. 1972).
43 Id. at 1164. The decedent and his wife had two children, Kathleen and John, Jr. Id.
John, Jr. and his wife, Faith, had a baby girl, Jean, but John, Jr. died less than one year after
her birth. Id. Approximately two years later, Faith married Richard Hansen. Id. Shortly
after the marriage, Richard adopted Jean with Faith's consent. Id. In his will, the decedent
devised all of his property to his wife, making no provision for the distribution of his
property in the event that his wife predeceased him. Id. Because the sole beneficiary of his
will predeceased him, he died intestate. Id. (referring to the common law rule as set forth
in In re Estate of Sims, 235 P.2d 204, 205 (Wash. 1951)). His daughter, Kathleen, was named
administrator. Id. Kathleen petitioned the court to declare that her niece, the decedent's
granddaughter, could not inherit from the decedent's estate. Id. Kathleen argued that jean
was not her grandfather's heir because she was adopted. In re Estates of Donnelly, 486 P.2d
1158, 1160 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
44
Id.at 1161.
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court, concluding that the legislature intended to sever an adopted child
45
from his or her natural bloodline for purposes of intestate succession.
The supreme court concluded that the child was an "issue" of the
decedent, her grandfather, and under normal circumstances would share
46
his estate as dictated by the descent and distribution statutes.
However, the court then proceeded to determine whether the child was
divested of her statutory inheritance right by another state statute, which
provided that "[a] lawfully adopted child shall not be considered an
'heir' of his natural parents for purposes of this title." 47 Thus, the issue
was whether the statute also precluded an adoptee from representing the
48
natural parent and thereby inheriting from the natural grandparent.
Noting that Washington's adoption statute divested the natural parent of
all legal rights and obligations associated with the child and provided
that the child would be entitled to inherit only from his or her adoptive
parent or parents, the Washington Supreme Court held that the child
was not entitled to inherit from her grandfather's estate.49

45 Donnelly, 502 P.2d at 1168. The court found that the legislative purpose was clear and
that the issue "should ...be decided in the context of the broad legislative objective of
giving the adopted child a 'fresh start' by treating [her] as the natural child of the adoptive
parent, and severing all ties with the past." Id. at 1166.
46 Id. at 1165. The decedent's estate would normally pass by the statute governing
intestacy, which provides in pertinent part:
The net estate of a person dying intestate ...shall be distributed as
follows: ...the entire net estate if there is no surviving spouse, shall
descend and be distributed .... To the issue of the intestate; if they are

all in the same degree of kinship to the intestate, they shall take
equally, or if of unequal degree, then those of more remote degree
shall take by representation.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015(2)(a) (1998) (emphasis added). Issue "includes all of the
lawful lineal descendants of the ancestor." Id. § 11.02.005(4). A descendant is "[o]ne who
follows in lineage, such as a child or grandchild -but not a collateral relative." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 455 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, both the daughter and granddaughter were
each a descendant and issue of Donnelly. Donnelly, 502 P.2d at 1165. The daughter would
take as the most immediate descendant, and the granddaughter would take by
representation as the sole issue of her deceased father. Id.
47 Id. at 1165 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.085). The court had previously held that
the legislature's intent was that an adopted child could not inherit a share of the natural
parent's estate by intestate succession. Id. at 1165.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1166. The statute provided that an adopted child "shall be ...the child, legal
heir, and lawful issue of his or her adopter or adopters, entitled to all rights and privileges,
including the right of inheritance ...and subject to all the obligations of a child ...
begotten in lawful wedlock." Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.140
(repealed 1985)).
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Nonmarital Children

At common law, a child born out of wedlock was filius nullius, a
child of no one, and could not inherit from either parent. 50 In order to
deal with this unfortunate condition in a more just and humane way, the
states turned to the civil law, which provided several methods by which
the child could be legitimated.51 Currently, all jurisdictions permit
inheritance from the mother, but the rules regarding inheritance from the
52
father vary.
In Trimble v. Gordon,53 the Supreme Court held an Illinois statute
denying a nonmarital child inheritance rights from the father
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 54 The statute in
question provided that nonmarital children could inherit only from their
mothers, but allowed marital children to inherit from both their mothers
and their fathers. 55 The purported purpose of the statute was to address

50

DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 32, at 115.

51

Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F.2d 464, 465-66 (10th Cir. 1930).

Judge McDermott, in his

dissent, noted that the Roman law provided six methods of legitimation: (1) subsequent
marriage of the parents; (2) consecration of the child to the state's use; (3) adoption; (4) the
father's last will; (5) special dispensation from the emperor; and (6) the father's recognition.
Id. at 470. Thus, the civil law places nonmarital children "upon the same footing as if born
in lawful wedlock." Id. (citation omitted).
52
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 32, at 115; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209
(Michie 1987) (a nonmarital child may inherit from and through the child's mother, but the
child may inherit from and through the child's father only if there is an adjudication of
paternity, a written acknowledgment or consent by the father, subsequent intermarriage by
the parents, or a written promise by or court order for the father to support the child);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-109(b)(II) (1987) (a nonmarital child is allowed to inherit when
paternity is proven by a preponderance of the evidence); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)
(2001) (a nonmarital child is a child of the mother, but the nonmarital child is a child of the
father only if the natural parents are subsequently married or if paternity is established by
an adjudication either before the father's death or after his death upon a showing of clear
and convincing proof).
53 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
54
Id. at 776. The Equal Protection Clause states, "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Deta Mona Trimble was the illegitimate daughter of Jessie
Trimble and Sherman Gordon. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 763-64. On January 2, 1973, a paternity
order found Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona. Id. at 764. He was ordered to pay
fifteen dollars per week in child support. Id. Thereafter, Gordon supported Deta Mona
and openly acknowledged her as his child. Id. He was murdered in 1974, leaving an
intestate estate consisting only of an automobile worth approximately $2,500. Id. The
probate court determined that Gordon's only heirs for purposes of intestate succession
were his father, mother, brother, two sisters, and a half brother. Id.
55
Id. at 763, The statute that permitted nonmarital children to inherit only from their
mothers stated:
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56
the state's interest in the promotion of legitimate family relationships.
However, the Court rejected this purpose and reasoned that promoting
family relationships was unrelated to illegitimate children's interests in
the estates of their fathers and mothers.5 7 The Court further held that the
alleged difficulty in proving paternity did not justify statutory
disinheritance.5 8 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the
decedent can assure his nonmarital children an inheritance by naming
them in a will.5 9

In Lalli v. Lalli,60 the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute that
permitted a nonimarital child to inherit from the father only if the father
had married the mother or had been formally adjudicated by a court
during the father's lifetime. 61 The statute required illegitimate children

An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal
ancestor, and of any person from whom his mother might have
inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall
represent such person and take, by descent, any estate which the
parent would have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate
whose parents inter-marry and who is acknowledged by the father as
the father's child is legitimate.
ld. at 764-65 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. c. 3, § 12 (1973)). The Probate Act further allowed
marital children to inherit from both parents. Id. at 763 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. c. 3, § 2-1(b)).
56
Id. at 768.
57
Id. at 768 n.13. Reflecting on the purported purpose, the Court commented:
This purpose is not apparent from the statute. Penalizing children as a
means of influencing their parents seems inconsistent with the desire
of the Illinois Legislature to make the intestate succession law more
just to illegitimate children. Moreover, the difference in the rights of
illegitimate children in the estates of their mothers and their fathers
appears to be unrelated to the purpose of promoting family
relationships.
Id. The Court further stated, "the Equal Protection Clause requires more than the mere
incantation of a proper state purpose." Id. at 769.
58
Id. at 772. Prior to his death, Gordon was found to be the father of Deta Mona in a
state-court paternity action, and was ordered to pay child support. Id. The Court
determined that the original adjudication was equally sufficient to establish the child's
right to claim a share of her father's estate, "for the State's interest in the accurate and
efficient disposition of property at death would not be compromised in any way by
allowing her claim in these circumstances." Id.
59
Id. at 774. This reasoning was illogical because had Gordon devised his estate to Deta
Mona in his will, the case would not have been before the Court. Id. The Court said, "Hard
questions cannot be avoided by a hypothetical reshuffling of the facts." Id.
439 U.S. 259 (1978).
60
61
Id. at 275. Robert Lalli was the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli, who died intestate in
1973. Id. at 261. Robert's mother, who died in 1968, never married Mario. Id. After
Mario's widow was appointed administrator of his estate, Robert petitioned the Surrogate's
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to provide a judicial order of filiation, a particular form of proof of
62
paternity, in order to inherit from their fathers by intestate succession.
Although this requirement was not imposed on legitimate children or
children born out of wedlock whose parents married each other, the
court found that the statute did not discriminate against the child. 63 The
court noted that the state's primary goal in enacting the statute was to
provide for the just and orderly disposition of property at death. 64
3.

Posthumously Born Children

Under common law, a pretermitted child, a child born after the will
was written or even after the parent's death, could cause the will to be
revoked. 65 Today, most states provide that an afterborn child is entitled

Court for a compulsory accounting. Id. Robert claimed that he and his sister Maureen
Lalli, as Mario's children, were entitled to inherit from his estate. Id.
62 Id. at 261-62. The statute provided in part:
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and
his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has,
during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring
paternity in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the
mother or within two years from the birth of the child.
Id. (quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967)).
63 Id. at 276. The Court noted that section 4-1.2 operated unfairly when it was applied to
those illegitimate children who could establish a relationship to their deceased fathers
without serious impact on the administration of estates. Id. at 272-73. Fairness, however,
was not the issue the Court was concerned with:
[F]ew statutory classifications are entirely free from the criticism that
they sometimes produce inequitable results. Our inquiry under the
Equal Protection Clause does not focus on the abstract "fairness" of a
state law, but on whether the statute's relation to the state interests it is
intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality
contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 273.
64 Id. at 268. The Court determined that this interest was directly implicated when
illegitimate children seek to inherit from their fathers because of the unusual problems of
proof that are involved. Id. Establishing "[t]hat the child is the child of a particular woman
is rarely difficult." Id. (quoting In re Ortiz, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (1969)). On the other
hand, proof of paternity may be difficult when the father is not part of the traditional
family unit. Id.
65 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 555 (2002). The common law rule was:
[T]he marriage of a man and the birth to the union thus consummated
of a child capable of inheriting from him-both events occurring
subsequent to the execution of his will - revoke the will so as to permit
the after-born child to take a share as an heir of the testator, in the
absence of a provision for the benefit of the child, or of anything in the
will to indicate that it was made in contemplation of marriage.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The birth of a posthumous child was also within this rule. Id.
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to some share of the estate even if he or she was omitted from the
66
decedent's will, so long as the omission was not intentional.
Pretermission laws are based on the notion that the testator merely
forgot to amend his will even though he or she was aware of the omitted
child. 67 Though the pretermission statutes cover technically all afterborn
children, including posthumous children, "the purpose of a
pretermission statute is to presume the deceased's intent regarding his
living children by presupposing that these children were overlooked
rather than intentionally excluded." 68
In 1884, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered
whether a child born nearly three months after her father's death should
receive a share of her father's estate. 69 The court held that the child was
entitled to a share of the estate to the same extent as if her father had
died intestate.70 The court reasoned that excluding the child from a
proportionate share of her father's estate would be unreasonable because
it would leave her "entirely dependent upon public support or the
charity of individuals." 71 Thus, to deny a share in the estate to any

66 Bailey, supra note 1, at 792. The UPC provides a share to the omitted afterborn child
unless "it appears from the will that the omission was intentional." UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-302(b)(1) (amended 1993), 8.1 U.L.A. 136 (2001). The intent must be evident in the will
itself; extrinsic evidence showing that the omission was intentional is not permitted. Id.
However, if a testator made nonprobate transfers to the omitted child, the testator's
statements or other extrinsic evidence can be used to show the testator's intent that these
transfers bar the child from claiming a pretermitted share. Id. § 2-302(b)(2), 8.1 U.L.A. 136;
see also In re Estate of Padilla, 641 P.2d 539, 544 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a
testator's will declaring that he had no children whom he had omitted from the will did not
disinherit his nonmarital child because "an affirmative, not negative, indication of intention
must appear on the face of the Will"); Estate of Peterson, 442 P.2d 980, 983 (Wash. 1968)
(holding that a testator's will declaring that he had no children did not disinherit a child
whose paternity he denied because there was "no indication in the will that the testator
remembered the [child] and intended to disinherit him").
67 Bailey, supra note 1, at 794.
68 Id. at 793.
69 Bowen v. Hoxie, 137 Mass. 527, 527-28 (1884). In his will, the child's father had named
his wife and the other nine children then living as beneficiaries of a $50,000 trust. Id. at 527.
70 Id. at 528. The court relied on PUB. STS. c. 127, § 22, which provided that "when a child
of a testator, born after his father's death, has no provision made for him by his father in his
will or otherwise, he shall take the same share of his father's estate that he would have been
entitled to if his father had died intestate." Id. at 527-28. The court further noted that
"marriage and the birth of a posthumous child are an implied entire revocation of a will
executed when single." Id. at 530.
71

Id. at 528.
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posthumously born child "would not only shock the testator himself, but
72
would be contrary to the common feelings of humanity."
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a posthumous,
nonmarital child was an heir of his father, and thus entitled to a share of
his father's estate. 73 The court concluded that a clear and convincing
evidence standard, rather than a preponderance of the evidence
standard, was the appropriate standard of proof that should be required
of an illegitimate, posthumous child in proving paternity.74 The court
defined the standard as follows: "Clear and convincing does not
necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is proof of
a probative and substantial nature carrying the weight of evidence
sufficient to convince ordinarily prudent minded people." 75 The court
determined that the child had established this proof by showing that (1)
the nature of the mother's relationship with the decedent was consistent
with him being the father; (2) the mother had informed others that
decedent was the father; and (3) the mother and decedent had planned to
76
be married the weekend he unexpectedly died.
In another case involving both illegitimacy and posthumous birth, a
child born nearly nine months after her father committed suicide was
granted survivor's benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. 77 The

72 Id.
73 Fykes v. Clark, 635 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Ky. 1982). The court initially determined that
Joseph had standing to prove his paternity because it saw no difference between the case at
hand and an illegitimate child born before the father's death who does not attempt to prove
paternity until after the father's death. Id. at 317.
74

Id. at 317-18.

75

Id. at 318 (citing Clemens v. Richards, 200 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Ky. 1947)).

76

Id.

77

Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1987). Title II of the Social Security Act states:
Every child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title) of an individual
entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or of an individual
who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child(A) has filed application for child's insurance benefits,
(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either
had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time elementary or
secondary school student and had not attained the age of 19, or (ii) is
under a disability (as defined in section 423(d) of this title) which
began before he attained the age of 22, and
(C) was dependent upon such individual(i) if such individual is living, at the time such application was
filed,
(ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death, or
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issue was whether the child was dependent on her father within the
meaning of the act.78 In order to establish dependency, the child had to
show that her deceased father was in fact her father and that he was
living with her or contributing to her support at the time of his death.79
The Ninth Circuit applied the test from Doran v. Schweiker,80 and
determined that even though the father did not provide baby clothes,
diapers, bottles, or other tangible items, he still satisfied the support
requirement by making contributions to the mother's support.81
82
Therefore, the child was considered indirectly dependent on her father.
The court stressed that an objective standard rather than a subjective
standard of intent to support was to be applied because "[i]ntent cannot
3
be shown when the father [has] no knowledge of the pregnancy."

(iii) if such individual had a period of disability which continued
until he became entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or
(if he has died) until the month of his death, at the beginning of such
period of disability or at the time he became entitled to such benefits,
shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit ....
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2000).
78 Heckler, 820 F.2d at 1095. Hossler and Smith, who were both separated from their
spouses, began an intimate relationship in May, 1982. Id. at 1094. They spent almost every
night and all of their free time together. Id. They shared expenses for cars, groceries, and
laundry. Id. Hossler often paid for the gas for Smith's car. Id. Hossler killed himself on
July 27, 1982. Id. The next day, Smith confirmed her pregnancy. Id. She gave birth to
Ariana on April 4, 1983. Id.
79 Id. at 1095; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii).
so
681 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1982). If the father's support is "commensurate with the needs
of the unborn child at the time of the father's death," then the child is qualified for
survivor's benefits. Id. at 608-09 (quoting Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir.
1975)).
81 Heckler, 820 F.2d at 1095. In Doran, the father had made two contributions to the
mother's support-he helped her move to another home and repaired her roof. 681 F.2d at
609. The Heckler court disagreed with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the
gifts to the mother could not be construed as evidence of the father's intent to contribute
support to Ariana because he had no actual knowledge of the pregnancy. 820 F.2d at 1095.
The court noted that "few parents purchase [baby] items before or during the third month
of pregnancy." Id. at 1096 (alteration in original) (quoting Doran, 681 F.2d at 609).
82
Id. at 1095-96.
83 Id. at 1095. The court stated:
There is no logical reason for imposing an intent requirement during
the early months of pregnancy when we require no manifestation of
separate support for the child. Intent cannot be shown when the father
had no knowledge of the pregnancy. Even when the father has
knowledge of the pregnancy, intent may be impossible to prove in
early pregnancy cases, because support of the baby would likely be as
indirect as it was in Doran.
Id. at 1095-96.
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As illustrated, states began to recognize that adopted children,
nonmarital children, and posthumously born children should not be
denied inheritance rights, in essence punished, for the accidents of their
birth. In light of current and future ARTs, the definition of "child" is
broadening even more. Children are now being conceived, not just born,
after the death of one or both natural parents through the use of
cryopreserved reproductive materials. Courts may soon be faced with
questions surrounding the survivorship and inheritance rights of these
children, but the present laws do not adequately provide guidance.
4.

Posthumously Conceived Children

Under present law, posthumous children born to the widow of a
deceased father are treated as "in being" and are able to inherit if the
4
child is born alive within either 280 or 300 days after the father's death.8
The 280-300 day gestation period presumes that the child is the married
A child who is born after being
decedent's legitimate child. 85
cryopreserved as a preembryo would fall within this statutory period
86
because the child would have been conceived before the parent's death.
However, if the decedent left only frozen gametes rather than embryos
in storage, a child born from those gametes would not be conceived until
after the parent's death, and thus, would not satisfy the statutory
87
period.

84 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 32, at 97. The 280-day presumption has been
established by the judicial system. Id. Two-hundred-and-eighty days is approximately
forty weeks, or nine months. Id. On the other hand, the Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA")
presumes that the normal period of gestation is 300 days. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204
(amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 311 (2001).
85 Id. § 204(2), 9B U.L.A. 311.
86 Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive
Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1154 (1997). The embryo, however, may not be
implanted and born until years after the parent dies. Id. If the mother dies, a surrogate
could gestate the embryo. Id.
87 Id. An example of the need to address this situation can be drawn from the Rios case.
Barry Brown, Courts Have Been Reluctant to Extend Property Rights Analysis into the Area of
Reproductive Authority, Leaving Them Unable to Articulate a Cogent Basis for Their Decisions, 6
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 73, 77 (1995). Mario and Elsa Rios, two very wealthy Americans,
were killed in a plane crash in 1983. Id. At the time of their deaths, they had two preembryos preserved at an Australian medical center. Id. There was speculation that the preembryos might be considered beneficiaries or heirs at law to the decedents. Id. A
California trial court finally settled the matter, holding that the pre-embryos were neither
the heirs nor the property of the estate. Id.
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An initial issue in posthumous reproduction is whether reproductive
materials may be classified as property.88 If they are not property, then a
donor's interest in his sperm remains with him and, consequently, will
die with him. 89 Accordingly, legal postmortem insemination would be
impossible, and the issue whether resulting children would have
intestacy rights would not need to be addressed. 90
Courts have often found that defining "property" is a difficult task. 91
Some judges and commentators recognize that the term "property" more
accurately refers to the relationship between things and people rather
than only to things.92 Black's Law Dictionary defines property as "the
right of ownership," but does not identify the meaning of the term
"ownership" within the definition. 93 However, the law recognizes that
when someone demonstrates sufficient control over something, he or she
is deemed to "own" that thing. 94 On the other hand, the law does not
recognize ownership in items that cannot be placed under someone's
physical control. 95 Therefore, the proper inquiry is whether anyone can
demonstrate sufficient physical control over genetic material.96

8
Corvalan, supra note 4, at 338. According to The American Fertility Society,
reproductive materials, including sperm, are the property of the donors. Robert J. Kerekes,
My Child ... But Not My Heir: Technology, the Law and Post-Mortem Conception, 31 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 213, 218 (1996).
89
Corvalan, supra note 4, at 338-39. For an argument that sperm should not be
considered property, see Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm as Property: In the Absence of a Compelling
Argument Against Posthumous Reproduction, Individual Autonomy Should Prevail, 6 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 57, 64-66 (1995).
90
Corvalan, supra note 4, at 339.
91 Bailey, supra note 1, at 757; see, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir.
1991) ("The concept of 'property' in the law is extremely broad and abstract. The legal
definition of 'property' most often refers not to a particular physical object, but rather to the
legal bundle of rights recognized in that object.").
92 Bailey, supra note 1, at 757.
93 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (7th ed. 1999). The term "ownership" is separately
defined as "[t]he collection of rights allowing one to use and enjoy property, including the
right to convey it to others. Ownership implies the right to possess a thing, regardless of
any actual or constructive control." Id. at 1131.
94 Bailey, supra note 1, at 757.
95 Id. at 758.
96
The courts have appeared to reach a consensus and have classified gametes as having
an "interim" property interest, somewhere between an object and a life. Corvalan, supra
note 4, at 339. While there is no straightforward property interest in gametes as there is in
an object such as a car or a television set, there is also not a complete absence of a property
interest in gametes as there is in a person or a life. Id.
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The California Court of Appeals faced this issue in Hecht v. Superior
when it considered whether a decedent's sperm was "property"
that could be bequeathed to his girlfriend by will.98 Nine days before he
committed suicide, the decedent wrote a letter stating his intent that his
girlfriend, Deborah Hecht, use his preserved sperm to have a child. 99
The trial court ordered the sperm destroyed, but Hecht was successful in
seeking an immediate stay on the verdict.100 The appellate court
reversed the order to destroy the sperm, finding that "Hecht is not only
the residual beneficiary specified therein, but the will evidences the
decedent's intent that Hecht, should she so desire, is to receive his sperm
stored in the sperm bank to bear his child posthumously." 10 1
Court,9 7

The appellate court initially determined that the decedent's interest
in his cryogenically preserved sperm was "property" over which the
probate court had jurisdiction. 10 2 In order to reach this decision, the
10 3
appellate court was confronted with the question, "What is property?"
To answer this question, the court relied on a provision of the California
Probate Code, which provided that property is "anything that may be
the subject of ownership and includes both real and personal property
and any interest therein." 1°4 Therefore, the decedent had a right to
bequeath his sperm, in which he had an ownership interest while he was
living, to his girlfriend. 10 5

97 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
98 Id. at 281-84.
99 Id.at 277. The letter stated, "I address this to my children, because, although I have
only two, Everett and Katy, it may be that Deborah [Hecht] will decide-as I hope she
will - to have a child by me after my death. I've been assiduously generating frozen sperm
samples for that eventuality." Id.
Id. at 279-80.
101 Id. at 283-84. The court noted, in dicta, that in light of the UPA and UPC sections 6407
100

and 6408, "it is unlikely that the estate would be subject to claims with respect to any such
children." Id. at 290.
102 Id. at 283. The court concluded that the argument raised by the decedent's children
that the decedent had no ownership or possessory interest in his sperm once it left his body
was "self-defeating." Id. at 280-81 (using the rationale of Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
51 Cal. 3d 120, 136-37 (1990)).
103 Id. at 281.
104 Id. (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 62 (West 2002)).
105 Id. at 283. Although the court concluded that the sperm was part of the decedent's

estate, it did "not address the issue of the validity or enforceability of any contract or will
purporting to express [the] decedent's intent with respect to the stored sperm." Id. The
court also addressed the argument that public policy forbade the artificial insemination of
the decedent's girlfriend because she was an unmarried woman. Id. at 284-88 (discussing
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986)).
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In reaching its decision, the Hecht court noted that only one other
court, a French court, had addressed the property interest in
reproductive materials. 10 6 In Parpalaixv. CECOS,1° 7 Alain Parpalaix, who
was suffering from testicular cancer, made one deposit of sperm at the
Center d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme ("CECOS"), but left no
instructions as to the future use of the sperm. 108 At the time of the
deposit, Alain was living with Corinne, whom he later married.10 9 Two
days after their marriage, Alain died. 110 Soon thereafter, Corinne
requested his sperm deposit from CECOS, which denied the request just
as other centers had denied other widows' requests."' Corinne, joined
by Alain's parents, pursued the matter in court, where they contended
that as his natural heirs, widow and parents, they had become the legal
112
owners of the sperm and CECOS had broken the bailment contract.
They also argued that they had a moral right to the sperm. 113 Among its
arguments, CECOS contended that (1) it owed a legal obligation only to
the donor, not to the wife; (2) because sperm is "an indivisible part of the
body, much like a limb, [or] an organ," it is not inheritable absent
express instructions; and (3) the act of depositing sperm was strictly for

Id. at 287.
Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 12, at 229-33. Shapiro and Sonnenblick obtained
their information concerning the Parpalaixcase from the Gazette du Palais, September 15,
1984, at 11-14. Id.
108 Id. at 229-30. The complication in this case was that the sperm bank assumed that
Alain's sperm would be used only if he survived the treatment and not if he died. Id. at 231
(stating CECOS' argument that "since Alain failed to state his wishes in regard to the
sperm's future use, and since he and Corrine were not married at the time he made the
deposit, his intentions... were unclear[; therefore], the sperm deposit should not be turned
over").
109
Id. at 230.
110 Id.
11l Id. (observing that CECOS' procedures did not provide for the return of the sperm
without prior instruction from the depositor).
112
Id. CECOS referred Corinne to the Ministry of Health, which had previously found
"that both the husband and the wife must consent to [AI]." Id. However, the Ministry
decided not to address the matter until a later time. Id. Corinne, reacting with outrage,
pursued the matter in court. Id. She and Alain's parents argued that CECOS had broken
its contract by not returning Alain's sperm to his natural heirs, who were the true owners.
Id. They relied on a provision of the French Civil Code, which stated, "In the case of death
of the person who made the bailment, the thing bailed may be returned only to his heir."
Id.
113 Id. at 231. Corinne's attorney urged the court to "[l]et her give life to this child, the
fruit of a love that she goes on expressing with quiet determination. It is her most sacred
right." Id.
106

107
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therapeutic purposes, to aid Alain psychologically, and that his wife
11 4
giving birth to his child was not a therapeutic matter.
The French court expressly declined to apply ordinary contract
principles as suggested by Corrine's family, finding that human sperm
could not be characterized as movable, inheritable property." 5 Instead,
the court determined that the sole issue was intent-whether Alain
Parpalaix intended his widow to be artificially inseminated with his
sperm and whether that intent was "unequivocable." 116 The court found
that the testimony of Alain's widow and his parents established his
117
desire to make his wife the mother of his child.

Id. Before discussing the parties' contentions:
the [court] acknowledged and briefly described the difficulties that
French laws governing inheritance rights and illegitimacy would
impose on a child born "post-mortem." By strict interpretation of the
Civil Code ... any child born more than 300 days after the putative
father's death is deemed illegitimate. Even if the reach of the article
were to be miraculously interpreted or legislatively altered to establish
paternity, the child would be barred from inheriting through his father
pursuant to another article of the code which states that to inherit, the
child must exist at the time of death and then expressly disqualifies
"[o]ne who is not yet conceived."
Id. at 231-32 (citations omitted).
115 Id. at 232. The court further characterized sperm as "the seed of life ... tied to the
fundamental liberty of a human being to conceive or not to conceive." Id. Shapiro and
Sonnenblick explained, "This fundamental right must be jealously protected, and is not to
be subjected to the rules of contracts. Rather, the fate of the sperm must be decided by the
person from whom it is drawn." Id.
116 Id. The court took all relevant factors into consideration. Id. Thus, the absence of a
written document showing intent did not by itself preclude Corinne from using Alain's
sperm. Id.
117 Id. Corinne was eventually artificially inseminated with Alain's sperm, but she did
not become pregnant. Id. at 233. According to Shapiro and Sonnenblick:
Although the Parpalaix decision has been generally acclaimed as
eminently humane, it has been criticized by doctors and lawyers alike.
The court's order is a victory for the widow and even for the father
who can sire a child from the grave, but it may be detrimental to the
child. Though the court permitted Corinne Parpalaix to continue
expressing her love for Alain by bearing his child, nowhere in the
Parpalaixdecision did it address and consider the best interests of the
child. Commentators have suggested that the child could suffer
psychologically from being conceived by a dead man. How such
psychological effects would differ from those experienced by a child
born to an unmarried woman by AID or a child who, at a very young
age, loses his father, remains to be explained.
Id. at 246-47 (footnotes omitted).

114
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The first case in the United States to address the actual intestacy
rights of children conceived posthumously was Hart v. Shalala." 8 On
June 4, 1991, Nancy Hart gave birth to a baby girl, Judith, almost thirteen
months after the death of her husband, Edward.11 9 Judith was conceived
by GIFT three months after her father's death.120 Nancy applied for
121
survivor's benefits for Judith approximately one year after her birth.
The SSA concluded that Judith was not Edward's legal child and denied
Nancy's claim on several grounds. 122 First, Judith did not qualify as her
father's heir for intestacy purposes because she was neither alive at his
death nor born within 300 days after his death. 123 Second, Judith was
considered an illegitimate child because her father's death legally
dissolved the marriage between him and Judith's mother. 124 However,
during proceedings before the Louisiana district court, the Social
Security Commissioner announced that Judith Hart would be paid
survivor's benefits. 125 The Commissioner stated that "in light of [r]ecent
advances in modern medical practice, particularly in the field of
reproductive medicine," the resolution of the significant public policy
issues "should involve the executive and legislative branches, rather
12 6
than the courts."
Similarly, a mother sought Social Security benefits for her twin
daughters, who were conceived by IVF and born nearly eighteen months
after their father's death, in In re Estate of Kolacy.127 The state urged the
See Banks, supra note 5, at 251-57 (citing and discussing Hart v. Shalala, No. 94-3944
(E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1994) (unpublished opinion)).
119 Id.at 251.
120 Id. For a description of the GIFT procedure, see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying
text.
121 Banks, supra note 5, at 251.
122 Id. at 251-52.
123 Id. at 252.
124 Id. Judith was unable to prove filiation within the one-year-after-death statute of
limitations because she was only ten days old when the time limitation expired in her case.
Id. Further, Judith's birth certificate was not available, and her mother was recovering
from childbirth and was unable to file a petition. Id.
125
Id.at 255.
126 Id. at 256 (alteration in original).
127 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). On February 7, 1994, William Kolacy
was diagnosed with leukemia. Id. at 1258. His doctors advised him to begin chemotherapy
as soon as possible. Id. The morning after the diagnosis, William and his wife,
Mariantonia, decided to harvest William's sperm in fear that he would be rendered infertile
by either the disease or its treatment. Id. After one month of chemotherapy, William
underwent a second harvesting of sperm and deposited it in the same sperm bank. Id. On
April 15, 1995, William passed away. Id. Almost a year after his death, Mariantonia
underwent an IVF procedure uniting William's sperm and her eggs. Id.; see also supra
118
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Superior Court of New Jersey not to adjudicate the case for a number of
reasons, including the assertion that the decision whether to grant Social
Security benefits is strictly a federal matter. 12 However, the court
decided that a present determination of the twins' status as heirs was
appropriate "because of the effect it has on their general legal and social
status and because of the impact that it may have upon property rights
as they evolve over a period of time." 129
The statute at issue provided, "Relatives of the decedent conceived
before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in
the lifetime of the decedent." 130 From this provision, the court discerned
a basic legislative intent that children should be able to take property
131
directly from their parents and through their parents from relatives.
The court further observed that the general intent should prevail over
the literal reading of the statute due to the emergence of new
reproductive technologies that the legislature had not had reason to
address in the statute. 132 The court noted that the legislature would
probably need to deal with the difficult legal issues that evolving ARTs

notes 19-21 and accompanying text for a description of the IVF procedure. Mariantonia
gave birth to Amanda and Elyse, twin girls, on November 3, 1996, slightly more than
eighteen months after their father's death. Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1258.
128
Id. at 1259-60. The State argued that the case was not justiciable because Mariantonia
was asserting that her children were entitled to Social Security benefits, which are federal
rights that should be restricted to federal tribunals. Id. at 1259. The State further argued
that "because William Kolacy left no assets and thus had no estate at the time of his death,
there is really no point in determining who are his heirs under New Jersey law." Id. at
1260.
129
Id. The court noted that William might have an estate at a future date, yet the reality
that the children could take from his parents or collateral relatives if they died intestate was
a more significant reason for a determination. Id. The children might also have inheritance
rights under the wills of their father's relatives if declared his heirs. Id.
130
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West 1983)).
131
Id. at 1262.
132
Id. at 1261-62.
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create. 133 Ultimately, the court declared that Amanda and Elyse were the
134
legal heirs of William under New Jersey's intestate laws.
In a similar case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was
asked to answer the certified question whether posthumously conceived
children enjoyed the same inheritance rights as those of natural children
under Massachusetts' intestate succession law.135 As in Kolacy, Warren
and Lauren Woodward arranged to have some of Warren's semen
medically withdrawn and preserved after he was diagnosed with
136
leukemia and advised that the treatment might leave him sterile.
Warren then underwent a bone marrow transplant, which was not
successful. 1 37 Almost two years after his death, Lauren gave birth to
twin girls, who were conceived through AIH using their father's
138
preserved sperm.
In January 1996, Lauren applied for Social Security survivor benefits
for her two children, as well as for herself.1 39 Her eligibility for such

133 Id. The court declared:
The evolving human productive technology opens up some wonderful
possibilities, but it also creates difficult issues and potential problems
in many areas. It would undoubtedly be useful for the Legislature to
deal consciously and in a well informed way with at least some of the
issues presented by reproductive technology....
It would
undoubtedly be both fair and constitutional for a Legislature to impose
time limits and other situationally described limits on the ability of
after born children to take from or through a parent. Inthe absence of
legislative provision in that regard, it would undoubtedly be fair and
constitutional for courts to impose limits on the ability of after born
children to take in particular cases.
Id.
134 Id. at 1264.
135 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002). A "certified
question" is "[a] point of law on which a U.S. court of appeals seeks guidance from either
the U.S. Supreme Court or the highest court in a state." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 220 (7th
ed. 1999). The certified question in Woodward was:
If a married man and woman arranged for sperm to be withdrawn
from the husband for the purpose of artificially impregnating the wife,
and the woman is impregnated with that sperm after the man, her
husband, has died, will children resulting from such pregnancy enjoy
the inheritance rights of natural children under Massachusetts' law of
intestate succession?
760 N.E.2d at 259.
136 Id. at 260.
137
Id.
138 Id.; see supra note 14 and accompanying text for a description of AIH.
139 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260.
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benefits hinged on her children's eligibility.140 The SSA rejected her
claims, concluding that she had failed to establish that the twin girls
were her husband's "children" within the meaning of the Social Security
Act. 41 Lauren then presented evidence, including a judgment of
paternity and amended birth certificates that added her deceased
husband as the twins' father, to the SSA, but the agency remained
unpersuaded. 142 She then brought her claim before a United States
Administrative Law Judge, who concluded that because the children
were not entitled to inherit under Massachusetts intestacy and paternity
laws, they did not qualify for Social Security benefits. 143 Lauren sought a
declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the
The district court judge certified the
District of Massachusetts."'"
question to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts because no
directly applicable Massachusetts precedent existed as to the issue of
145
whether the children possessed intestacy rights.
Lauren argued that under Massachusetts law of intestate succession,
posthumously conceived children, because of their genetic connection
with the decedent, "must always be permitted to enjoy the inheritance
rights of the deceased parent's children." 146 On the other hand, the
government argued that posthumously conceived children should never
enjoy intestacy rights because they are not "in being" at the time of the
147
father's death within the meaning of the statute.

Id. at 260 n.3. Lauren was claiming both "child's benefits" and "mother's benefits"
under the SSA. Id. at 260. "Mother's benefits" are provided to the widow of a fully insured
4
individual if she has to care for a child. Id. at 260 n.3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 02(g)(1) (2000)).
141 Id. at 260. The Act defines children as the "child or legally adopted child of an
individual." Id. at 260 n.4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)). The Act also establishes a requirement
of dependency. Id.; see supranote 77 and accompanying text.
142 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 261.
143 Id. The Administrative Law Judge reasoned that "the children were not 'ascertainable
heirs as defined by the intestacy laws of Massachusetts,' because they were neither born
nor in utero at the date of the husband's death and 'the statutes and cases contemplated an
ascertainable child, one who had been conceived prior to the father's death."' Id. at 261 n.6
(citations omitted in original).
144 Id. at 261; accord In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2000) (noting that mother of posthumously conceived children had also sought declaratory
judgment).
145 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 261. The Massachusetts Supreme Court was aware of only
two cases that had addressed the issue: Hecht and Kolacy. Id. at 261 n.9. Hecht is discussed
at supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Kolacy, see supra notes
127-134 and accompanying text.
146 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 262 (emphasis added).
147 Id.
140
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The statute did not provide any definitive guidance, so the court
considered whether and to what extent, consistent with the purposes of
Massachusetts intestacy law, a child resulting from posthumous
reproduction may take as an intestate heir of the deceased genetic
parent. 148 The court addressed three powerful state interests: (1) the
child's best interests, (2) the state's interest in orderly administration of
149
estates, and (3) the genetic parent's reproductive rights.
Taking these interests into consideration, the court held that in
certain limited circumstances, a posthumously conceived child might
enjoy inheritance rights as "issue" under the Massachusetts intestacy
statute. 150 The court acknowledged that these limited circumstances
exist when the surviving parent demonstrates a genetic relationship
between her child and the decedent, and when there is evidence that the
decedent consented to posthumous conception and to the support of the
resulting child.15 ' In this case, the court found that although the
deceased husband was the genetic father of the wife's children, that fact
alone was not sufficient to establish legal parentage. 5 2 At the time, there
was no evidence presented of the deceased husband's consent to support
such children.1 53 Consequently, the court did not grant Social Security
benefits to the twins.154

148 Id. at 264. The court began its analysis with the intestacy law of Massachusetts. Id. at
262. Section 1 of the statute provides that "issue" of a decedent are entitled to inherit a
fixed portion of his estate subject to debts, expenses, and the rights of the surviving spouse.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 1 (West 1993). The statute itself does not define "issue,"
though in the context of intestacy the term is generally understood to mean "all lineal
(genetic) descendants, and now includes both marital and nonmarital descendants."
Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 263 (footnote omitted).
Another provision states that
"[p]osthumous children shall be considered as living at the death of their parent," but once
again fails to define the term "posthumous children." Id. at 264; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 190, § 8. The court pointed out that the statute does not contain an express
requirement that posthumous children must "be in existence" at the time of their father's
death. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 264. "In the absence of express legislative directives, [the
court] construe[s] the Legislature's purposes from statutory indicia and judicial decisions in
a manner that advances the purposes of the intestacy law." Id.
149 Id. at 265; see also infra Part ILA-C.
150 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272.
151 Id. The court further noted that a posthumous child's claim for succession rights may
be precluded by time limitations, but it was not going to address such limitations in the
present case. Id. at 259.
152

Id. at 271.

153 Id. The court noted, however, that the wife could come forward with other evidence as
to her deceased husband's consent to posthumously conceive children. Id.
154

Id.
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As ARTs advance, the number of posthumously conceived children
will continue to multiply, as will the complex ethical, moral, legal, and
social issues that surround their births. Existing case law has confirmed
that solutions outside the adversary process must be found, as the
process only considers the interests and rights of the parties in the case at
hand. As the Hart court contemplated, the legislature should be
involved in recommending a comprehensive scheme that would provide
more certainty and predictability for families considering posthumous
155
conception.
III.

ANALYSIS

This Part identifies the legal problems that arise in determining
under what circumstances a posthumously conceived child should share
in the deceased parent's estate. In considering whether a posthumously
conceived child is a child of the deceased parent for purposes of
inheritance, several factors should be considered. Part III.A discusses the
importance in promoting the best interests of the posthumously
conceived child.15 6 Part III.B discusses the state's interest in the timely
administration of estates. 157 Part III.C considers the importance of
determining the deceased's intent to conceive a child posthumously.15 8
Part III.D examines the current proposals that address the inheritance
problems surrounding the birth of posthumously conceived children.1 59
Based on these considerations, a proposal is then offered for a revision to
the UPC that can serve as a model for state statutory amendment.
A. Best Interests of the Posthumously Conceived Child
Whenever a child is involved in any type of legal dispute, there is
concern to promote and protect that child's best interests.16° Among the

155

See supra text accompanying note 126.

See infra Part
157 See infra Part
158 See infra Part
159
See infra Part
156

III.A.
III.B.

III.C.
III.D.

160 For example, many states consider the best interests of the child in awarding custody.
The child custody statute in Indiana provides, "The court shall determine custody and
enter a custody order in accordance with the best interests of the child. In determining the
best interests of the child, there is no presumption favoring either parent. The court shall
consider all relevant factors .... IND. CODE. § 31-17-2-8 (1998) (emphasis added). The
best interests of the child are also considered in awarding child support. See In re Marriage
of Beecher, 582 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Iowa 1998) (recognizing both parents' duty to provide
adequate support for their children).
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many rights and protections afforded to all children is the right to
financial support. 161 Many children receive this support from their
162
parents or, if their parents are deceased, from their parents' estates.
Government benefits and entitlements exist for those children who do
not receive sufficient financial support from either their parents or
deceased parents' estates. 163 The same rights and protections should be
granted to posthumously conceived children, because although they
,may not come into the world the way the majority of children do ...
they are children nonetheless." 164
Granting government benefits and entitlements to posthumously
conceived children is one method of providing for their financial
needs. 165 However, increasing the number of children on public
assistance increases the burden placed on taxpayers. Public policy
dictates that children should be provided for as completely as possible,
166
from their parents' resources, thereby alleviating this burden.
Therefore, when a deceased parent's estate could sufficiently support a
posthumous child, another option would be to grant that child
inheritance rights. Hence, placing an outright ban on the ability of
posthumously conceived children to inherit or receive survivor's benefits
would be contrary to their best interests and, arguably, the public's
167
interest.
While the best interests of posthumously conceived children are of
great importance, they are not conclusive in the context of intestacy

Woodward v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 265 (Mass. 2002).
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of pretermission.
163 Child poverty rates vary widely across demographic groups. Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families, 4TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONG., ch. IX (April 2002), at http://www.acf.
hhs.gov/programs/opre/ar2001/chapter9.htm (last modified May 22, 2002). There are
also significant variations in child poverty rates according to marital status. Id. For
example, "[a] child living in a single-parent family is about four-and-one-half times as
likely to be poor as a child living in a two-parent family." Id. Approximately forty percent
of the children living only with their mothers are poor. Id. Fortunately, the child poverty
rate in the year 2000 was the lowest since 1978. Id.
164 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266.
165
See supra note 5.
166 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265 (referring to the policy laid out by MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119A, § 1 (West 1993)).
167 See Susan E. Satava, Comment, DiscriminationAgainst the Unacknowledged Illegitimate
Child and the Wrongful Death Statute, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 933, 984 (1996). "[Tihe primary
purpose of survivors' benefits is to provide support for the dependents of a deceased wage
earner." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Daniels v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 1516, 1521 (11th
Cir. 1992)).
161
162
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law. 168 They must be balanced against the other important state
interests -namely the timely administration of estates and the intent of
the deceased to become a posthumous parent.
B.

Timely Administrationof Estates

A second factor to consider is the importance of providing certainty
to heirs and creditors effectuated through the accurate and prompt
administration of the decedent's estate. 169
The Kolacy court
acknowledged this concern, stating that "[e]states cannot be held open
for years simply to allow for the possibility that after born children may
come into existence. People alive at the time of a decedent's death who
are entitled to receive property from the decedent's estate are entitled to
receive it reasonably promptly." 17° The Hecht court also recognized
"[t]he interest of heirs and courts in the finality of probate rulings ....171
Therefore, in order to promote the best interests of posthumously
conceived children while at the same time respecting the state's interest
in the timely settlement of estates, certain time constraints should be
imposed on a posthumously conceived child's inheritance rights. 172 In
formulating a period of limitations, consideration must be given to the
current limitations on the time to file claims against an estate, the
ultimate time limitations on closing an estate, and the ability to reopen
an estate.
Every state has a nonclaim statute that specifies the time limits
within which a claimant must file its claims against a decedent's estate. 173
These statutes bar claims that are not filed within a period of time either
after probate proceedings have begun or after the decedent's death. 174
For example, the UPC bars claims against the estate that are not
presented within one year of the decedent's death. 175 Indiana, on the

16 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266.
169 Id.; see also Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855 (1986); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265
(1978).
170 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
171 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 290 (Ct. App. 1993).
17 See generally Corvalan, supra note 4, at 361-62. "Since public policy in most states
desires the smooth distribution of estates, allowing potential children to take without some
time limitations is highly unlikely." Id. at 362.
173 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 32, at 41; see, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-14-1 (1998).
174 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 32, at 41.

175 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803(a)(1) (amended 1993), 8.11 U.L.A. 215 (2001); see also
Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1991) (holding that claims against an estate are
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other hand, is slightly more stringent, and only allows nine months after
the death of the decedent for hrinoing non-tort claims against 4th
estate.1 76
Under the common law, a will could be probated at any time after
the decedent's death. 177 However, the UPC sets a three-year statute of
limitations on probate. 178 If a will is not probated within that time
period, the presumption of intestacy is conclusive. 79 The UPC also
allows an estate to be reopened, but only for limited circumstances. The
maximum time limit to recover property that has been improperly
distributed is either three years after the decedent's death or one year
from the time of the distribution. 80 The maximum time limit for
creditors, however, is restricted to one year after the decedent's death.' 8'
If other property of the estate is discovered subsequent to the closing of
an estate, the probate court may appoint a personal representative to
182
administer the newly discovered estate.
Although providing certainty to heirs and creditors is an important
state interest, timely estate administration "is not a sufficient justification
to deny posthumous children their rightful place in the family when the

not limited to obligations of the decedent that could have been enforced against him while
he was still alive).
176 IND. CODE § 29-1-14-1(d). Claims must also be filed either (1) three months after the
date of the first published notice to creditors or (2) three months after the court revokes
probate of a will in which the claimant is named a beneficiary, whichever is later. Id. § 291-14-1(c). While published notice to creditors is necessary in order to toll the time for filing
claims, failure to publish such notice does not bar the filing of a claim. See Schrenker v.
Methodist Hosp. of Ind., Inc., 233 N.E.2d 791, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968). For a discussion of
the notice requirement, see Robert Roy, Annotation, Validity of Nonclaim Statute or Rule
Provisionfor Notice by Publication to Claimants Against Estate - Post-1950 Cases, 56 A.L.R.4TH
458 (1987). Tort claims against the estate may be filed at any time within the statute of
limitations provided for the tort action. IND. CODE § 29-1-14-1(f). The interest in the assets
of the estate is only affected by recovery against the tortfeasor's estate if the suit was filed
within the statute of limitations allowed for filing claims against the estate. Id.
177 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 32, at 40.
178

UNIF. PROBATE CODE

§ 3-108(a)(2), 8.11 U.L.A. 42.

Id. § 3-108 cmt., 8.11 U.L.A. 42.
180 Id. § 3-1006, 8.11 U.L.A. 299; see also In re Estate of Shuler, 981 P.2d 1109, 1116 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1999) (concluding that the probate court's order reopening the estate to resolve tax
issues did not preclude the court from expanding the scope of the reopened administration
by ordering the distributee to return the brokerage account proceeds that had been
improperly distributed to her).
181 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-1006, 8.11 U.L.A.299.
182 Id. § 3-1008, 8.11 U.L.A. 300-01.
179
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' 183
'Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.'
Therefore, speed and efficiency must be balanced against the best
interests of the posthumously conceived child. However, there is a third
state interest that must be added to the scale: the intent of the deceased
to become a posthumous parent.

C. The Importance of Intent
Ascertaining the intent of the deceased to become a posthumous
parent is important because of the individual's procreative rights and the
state's interest in carrying out the wishes of the deceased. In Meyer v.
Nebraska,18 4 the Supreme Court for the first time established the
fundamental right to procreate 185 when it recognized "the right of the
individual ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children." 186 In

183 Christopher A. Scharman, Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal Status of the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 1048 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 656 (1972)). Scharman further stated, "[I]f the family is 'deeply rooted in America's
history and tradition' and is the social institution through which 'we inculcate and pass
down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural,' then certainly the child's
right to establish legal membership within that family is more important than mere
administrative convenience." Id. at 1050 (footnote omitted) (citing Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977)).
184 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
185 Fundamental rights are liberties that are so important that the government cannot
infringe on them unless it meets strict scrutiny. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 695 (2001). Such liberties include "rights protecting family autonomy; procreation;
sexual activity and sexual orientation; medical care decision making; travel; voting; and
access to the courts." Id. These rights are protected under the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or, in rare instances, the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 696-97. In analyzing
fundamental rights, courts must consider: (1) whether there is a fundamental right, (2)
whether that right has been infringed, (3) whether the government has a compelling
interest justifying the infringement, and (4) whether the means are sufficiently related to
the purpose. Id. at 698-700. One commentator has suggested that if a constitutional right to
procreate exists, then restrictions placed on the bequest and inheritance of gametes risk
constitutional violations. Bailey, supra note 1, at 778.
186 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. However, four years later, the Court upheld a law that
permitted the involuntary salpingectomy (sterilization) of an allegedly retarded woman.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). The Court described Carrie Buck as a "feeble-minded
white woman." Id. at 205. Buck's mother and illegitimate child were also described as
feeble minded. Id. The state sterilized Buck under the authority of a Virginia statute,
which stated:
[T]he health of the patient and the welfare of society may be promoted
in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives, under careful
safeguard, [etc.]; that the sterilization may be effected in males by
vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy, without serious pain or
substantial danger to life; that the Commonwealth is supporting in
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Skinner v. Oklahoma,18 7 the Court explicitly recognized the right, stating,
"Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the [human] race." 18

various institutions many defective persons who if now discharged
would become a menace but if incapable of procreating might be
discharged with safety and become self-supporting with benefit to
themselves and to society; and that experience has shown that heredity
plays an important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility,
[etc.]
Id. at 205-06 (citing an Act of Virginia, approved Mar. 20, 1924). The statute gave the
superintendent of the mental institution the power to order sterilization when he was of
opinion that it was for the "best interests of the patients and of society that an inmate under
his care should be sexually sterilized." Id. at 206. In concluding that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not protect Buck from involuntary sterilization, Justice Holmes observed,
"Three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207. However, Buck was later
discovered to be a woman of normal intelligence. Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's
Daughter,2 CONST. COMMENT. 331, 336 (1985). Sadly, she was one of almost 20,000 "forced
eugenic sterilizations" that had been performed in the United States by 1935. Id. at 332.
In Gerber v. Hickman, Gerber was serving a sentence of 100 years to life plus eleven
years in the Mule Creek State Prison. 291 F.3d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 2002). He and his wife
wanted to have a baby, but the California Department of Corrections prohibited family
visits for inmates "sentenced to life without the possibility of parole [or] sentenced to life,
without a parole date established by the Board of Prison Terms." Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2000)). Because no
parole date seemed likely, Gerber wanted to artificially inseminate his wife. Id. Gerber
argued that his constitutional right to procreate arose out of the right to be free from forced
surgical sterilization combined with the right to marry while in prison. Id. at 622; see also
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that a law permitting the state to
sterilize habitual criminals was a violation of equal protection); Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F.
Supp. 1452, 1454 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (holding that the right to marry survives imprisonment).
The Ninth Circuit rejected his argument and held that "to artificially inseminate his wife as
a matter of constitutional right would be a radical and unprecedented interpretation of the
Constitution." Gerber, 291 F.3d at 623.
187

316 U.S. 535 (1942).

188 Id. at 541. Skinner was convicted in 1926 of stealing chickens, a felony involving
"moral turpitude." Id. at 537. In 1929, he was convicted of robbery with firearms. Id. He
was convicted again of robbery with firearms in 1934 and was sentenced to the
penitentiary. Id. One year later, Oklahoma passed the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act.
Id. at 536; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 171-195 (West 1991) (repealed as unconstitutional).
The Act defined an "habitual criminal" as:
a person who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes
Iamounting to felonies involving moral turpitude,' either in an
Oklahoma court or in a court of any other State, is thereafter convicted
of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal institution.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 173). The jury found that a
vasectomy could be performed on Skinner without detriment to his general health. Id. at
537. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act was unconstitutional as a
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On the other hand, Griswold v. Connecticut 89 established the right of
married couples to use contraception, thus exercising their right not to
procreate. 90 The Court extended this right of procreative choice to
unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird.191 As Justice Brennan
declared, "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
192
decision whether to bear or beget a child."
Closely related to the fundamental right to procreate is the right to
control the use of one's gametes. 193 Therefore, when the husband

violation of equal protection. Id. at 541. The Court observed that those who had
committed grand larceny three times could be sterilized, but those who were embezzlers
were immune from the Act. Id. The Court concluded, "When the law lays an unequal
hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes
one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a
particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment." Id. The Court noted, "The power
to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or
reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to
wither and disappear." Id.
189 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
190 Id. at 485. Griswold was the first of a series of Supreme Court cases to include the right
to reproductive freedom within a "zone of privacy" fashioned by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees. Id. at 485. The Court categorized the right to privacy as "a right
...older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school
system." Id. at 486. This right is created in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (understanding the Fourth Amendment as creating a "right
to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the
people"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (recognizing the protection
afforded by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments against all governmental invasions "of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life").
Griswold, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut,
and Buxton, a licensed physician, provided information, instruction, and medical advice to
married couples on preventing conception. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. Their services
included an examination of the wife and a recommendation of the best contraceptive
device for her use. Id. Griswold and Buxton were fined $100 each for violating provisions
of the General Statutes of Connecticut. Id. Section 53-32 provided, "Any person who uses
any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be
fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one
year or be both fined and imprisoned." Id. Section 54-196 provided, "Any person who
assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be
prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender." Id.
191 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The Court, following the reasoning of Griswold, found that
"the State [caninot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to
unmarried but not to married persons." Id. at 454.
192 Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
193 See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
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predeceases the wife, it is his and not her reproductive rights that are at
risk of being infringed. The Woodward court noted that nothing prevents
the wife from choosing to conceive a child using her deceased husband's
sperm.194 However, the deceased husband has the right not to father a
child conceived through ARTs. Thus, his true intentions regarding
posthumous conception must be considered.
The significance of intent to become a posthumous parent stems
from the state's overall interest in assuring the living that their wishes
will be carried out upon their death as directed. 195 State regulations
govern the probate of a will and the distribution of the estate in the event
of intestacy. The primary policy behind intestacy statutes is to carry out
the probable intent of the decedent. 96 Therefore, when an individual
shows significant intent of parenting a child posthumously, the state has
an interest in carrying out this wish as well.
The clearest way to establish such intent would be through an
express showing, such as through a writing. For example, in Hecht two

Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 269 (Mass. 2002).
Bailey, supra note 1, at 778 (stating that "[i]n the absence of a clearly articulated public
policy reason, the instructions of the deceased involving parenthood, even though
posthumous, should be followed").
196 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 32, at 74. States also recognize the individual's
interest in the disposition of his or her remains upon death. See B.C. Ricketts, Annotation,
Validity and Testamentary Direction as to Disposition of Testator's Body, 7 A.L.R.3D 747, 747
(1966). Courts have recognized that corpses, though not property in a commercial sense,
possess many of the attributes of property, and have frequently described them as "quasiproperty." See 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 2 (1988).
Despite adherence to the view that there can be no true property right
in a corpse, courts have refused to follow the doctrine to the end of
preventing anyone from seeing to it that the body is decently interred
and that the resting place uninterfered with, and, thus, have
recognized a quasi-property right in dead bodies for certain purposes.
Id. For example, in Osteen v. Southern Railway Co., the court held that when a person dies,
there exists a limited property interest in the body so that it may be decently interred and
its resting place may be uninterfered with. 86 S.E. 30, 31 (S.C. 1915). Osteen purchased six
tickets for himself, four others, and the dead body of his sister-in-law. Id. at 30. The
undertaker handed the ticket for the corpse to the station baggage agent, who gave him a
receipt for the coffin. Id. On the train, Osteen handed the collector the five remaining
tickets for the living members of the funeral party, but did not think to present the baggage
check for his sister-in-law's body. Id. Although Osteen protested that he had bought a
ticket for her corpse, the collector demanded and collected seventy cents in excess of the
legal fare rate. Id. The court awarded Osteen $2,000 in damages for violation of his rights
and feelings as a passenger. Id. Contra Griffith v. Charlotte, Colombia & Augusta R.R. Co.,
23 S.C. 25, 38-39 (1885) (noting that under the common law there is no property interest in
corpses).
194
195
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written documents evidenced William Kane's intent that Deborah Hecht,
his girlfriend, would bear him a child either before or after his death.197
A provision in his will provided, "it is my wish that, should [Hecht]
become impregnated with my sperm, before or after my death, she [may]
preserve any or all of my mementoes and diplomas and the like for our
future child or children." 198 Kane also wrote a letter to his children,
stating, "I address this to my children, because, although I have only
two, Everett and Katy, it may be that Deborah [Hecht] will decide -as I
hope she will-to have a child by me after my death. I've been
assiduously generating frozen sperm samples for that eventuality." 199
Although the Hecht court abstained from addressing the validity or
enforceability of the writing, these two documents would satisfy a
showing of express intent. However, not every individual who clearly
desires and intends to have a child anticipates his or her own death as a
factor in the decision. Therefore, posthumously conceived children
should also be allowed to demonstrate their parent's intent by some
means other than an express showing, such as through conduct. 20°
The Kolacy court acknowledged this possibility, noting that William
Kolacy "by his intentional conduct created the possibility of having longdelayed after born children." 20 1 The court also accepted Mariantonia's
statement that "her husband unequivocally expressed his desire that she
use his stored sperm after his death to bear his children" as evidence of
William's intent to become a posthumous parent. 2 2 Furthermore, the
Woodward court noted that the administrative law judge, who first heard
the case, would have considered "additional declarations or written
statements from the decedent's family, [the wife's] family, financial
records or records from the fertility institute that demonstrate any

197 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275,276-77 (Ct. App. 1993).
198 Id. (emphasis added).

199 Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
200 Corvalan, supra note 4, at 356 (discussing a proposal that allows courts and hospitals
to infer intent but limits the resulting child's legal rights); Shari Gilbert, Note, Fatherhood
from the Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 564 (1993)
(advocating a three-pronged test for determining whether postmortem insemination
should be permitted, and whether the resulting child would be legitimate). ContraChester,
supra note 14, at 984 (maintaining that the law of wills should not be extended to include
postmortem children absent the testator's express intent).
201 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
202 Id. at 1263.
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acknowledgement [of the children] made by [the husband]" as evidence
20 3
of his intent.
Determining the parent donor's intentions is also important because
of the implications on other donors. For this reason, allowing a mere
genetic tie or the mere deposit of sperm into a sperm bank as conclusive
evidence of intent to parent a child posthumously would subject
unsuspecting men to potential liabilities for every child that results from
the use of their sperm. 2°4 The Woodward court recognized this concern of
shielding sperm donors from the responsibilities of legal parentage in
order to encourage the beneficial practice of sperm donation. 20 5 Medical
treatment is not the only reason that a man chooses to preserve his
semen. He may also donate his sperm to an infertility clinic for use by
an anonymous third party. 20 6 Anonymous donors usually sign a contract
20 7
relinquishing all legal parental rights and responsibilities.
The Hecht court further observed this concern when it considered the
2 8
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act ("USCACA").
The Act's primary purpose of denying a legal parent-child relationship
to posthumously conceived children is to "provide finality for the
determination of parenthood of those whose genetic material is utilized
in the procreation process after their death." 20 9 According to the drafters
of the USCACA, such finality is necessary to "avoid the problems of
intestate succession which could arise if the posthumous use of a[ny]
person's genetic material could lead to the deceased being termed a
210
parent."

203 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 271 (Mass. 2002) (alterations in

original).
204 See, e.g., Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282. Sperm banks generally require anonymous
donors to sign a written waiver of rights and paternity claims when they make a deposit.
Id. In return, the donor's anonymity is guaranteed. Id. "Thus, according to the contract
between the parties, the donor no longer 'owns' the sperm." Id.
205 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 270 n.23.
206
207

Id.
Id.

208 Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
209

UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4 cmt., 9C U.L.A. 372

(2001).
210 Id. Although the comment to section 4 acknowledges that parents can "explicitly
provide for such children in their wills," posthumously conceived children cannot take in
the parent's estate through intestate succession because "implantation after the death of
any genetic parent would not result in that genetic parent being the legally recognized
parent." Id.
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Posthumous conception should not be permitted when the living
family members can only speculate about the deceased's wishes. 211 Even
if there is evidence that the deceased desired parenthood in life, to
assume that he or she would have actually wanted to become a parent
posthumously is too speculative. 212 Therefore, when the sperm or egg
donor dies, some indicia of intent to allow posthumous procreation and
to support the resulting child should exist.
In sum, the state has interests in promoting the best interests of
posthumously conceived children, in the prompt administration of
estates so as to provide certainty and finality to other heirs and creditors,
and in carrying out the reproductive wishes of the deceased. These
powerful interests must be balanced in promulgating regulations that
address inheritance rights in children conceived after one or both of their
parents' deaths through ARTs. State legislatures, "with their collective
resources, experience, and wisdom, could develop any number of
methods for achieving a balance between the interests of the state and
213
the interests of the posthumous child."
D. An Examination of Existing Proposals
Uniform acts are drafted "to promote uniformity in state law, on all
subjects where uniformity is desirable and practicable, by voluntary
action of each state government." 214 Uniformity in state law with respect
to inheritance rights in children, especially posthumously conceived
children, is desirable. Section 2-114 of the UPC addresses parent-child

Anne Reichman Schiff, Posthumous Conception and the Need for Consent: We Should
Require Prior Consent to Safeguard the Interests of the Deceased, 170 MED. J. AUSTRALIA 53, 7
(1998), at http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/janl8/schiff/schiff.html.
212 Id. 7.
If the deceased person's wishes are to be safeguarded adequately in
posthumous reproduction, clear evidence of intent to reproduce after
death should be required. The strong procreative interest of family
members seeking posthumous conception may tempt them to portray
the deceased's values and desires in ways that are not necessarily
compatible with the interests of the deceased. Given that posthumous
procreation, unlike organ donation, entails significant and permanent
implications for the deceased's family, the potential for a serious
conflict of interest justifies a far more limited decision-making role for
the family.
Id. 8.
213 Scharman, supra note 183, at 1050.
214 8.1 U.L.A. iii (2001).
211
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relationships for purposes of intestate succession. 215
This section
provides that children born out of wedlock may inherit as long as
parentage has been established. 216 The state's parentage statute provides
the requirements for establishing paternity. 217 Although there is some
variation among jurisdictions, "most states permit paternity to be
established by evidence of the subsequent marriage of the parents, by the
father's acknowledgment, by an adjudication during the father's life, or
by clear and convincing proof after the father's death." 218 The Special
Committee on Uniform Probate Code ("UPC Committee") has
suggested, however, that it would consider further revisions of this
section, as the issue of children's status for purposes of intestate
219
succession is under continuing review.
The parent-child relationship provision focuses on the status of
adopted and nonmarital children, but does not adequately address the
rights of posthumously conceived children. Therefore, by considering
other proposals that have been prepared to specifically address
inheritance rights in light of ARTs, this Note will propose an amendment

215 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (amended 1990), 8.1 U.L.A. 91 (2001). The UPC is an Act:
[rielating to affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons,
minors, incapacitated persons and certain others and constituting the
Uniform Probate Code; consolidating and revising aspects of the law
relating to wills and intestacy and the administration and distribution
of estates of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors,
incapacitated person and certain others; ordering the powers and
procedures of the Court concerned with the affairs of decedents and
certain others; providing for the validity and effect of certain nontestamentary transfers, contracts and deposits which relate to death
and appear to have testamentary effect; providing certain procedures
to facilitate enforcement of testamentary and other trusts; making
uniform the law with respect to decedents and certain others; and
repealing inconsistent legislation.
Id. purpose cl., 8.1 U.L.A. 9. Portions of the UPC have been adopted in sixteen states. Id.
tbl., 8.1 U.L.A. 1.
216 Id. § 2-114(a), 8.1 U.L.A. 91.
217

Id.

218 Patricia G. Roberts, Adopted and Non-marital Children -Exploring the 1990 Uniform
Probate Code's Intestacy and Class Gift Provisions, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 539, 542 (1998)
(citing JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRusTS, AND ESTATES 107 (5th

ed. 1995)).
219 UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II cmt. 4, 8. U.L.A. 79 ("Although only a modest revision of
the section dealing with the status of adopted children and children born of unmarried
parents is made at this time, the question is under continuing review and further revisions
may be presented in the future.").
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to the parent-child provision of the UPC. The first proposal, the UPA,220
suggests that intention, rather than biology, is the controlling factor in
determining whether a deceased parent of a posthumously conceived
221
The
child is the legal parent of the child for purposes of inheritance.
second proposal, the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model
Reproductive Technologies Act,222 suggests a solution to the problem
raised by timely estate administration and proposes requirements for
223
establishing the decedent's intent to become a posthumous parent.
1.

Uniform Parentage Act

Section 102(4) of the UPA defines "assisted reproduction" as a
method of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse. 224 The term
includes intrauterine insemination, donation of eggs and embryos, IVF
and transfer of embryos, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection.225 Article
7 of the Act is entitled "Child of Assisted Reproduction." 226 UPA section
701 explains that Article 7 applies only to children born as the result of
If a child is conceived through sexual
assisted reproduction. 227
intercourse or is the result of a surrogacy agreement, then this section of

220 UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 707 (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 358 (2001). The UPA was
originally drafted in 1973 "at a time when the states need[edl new legislation on this
subject because the bulk of current law on the subject of children born out of wedlock [was]
either unconstitutional or subject to grave constitutional doubt." Id. prefatory n. (repealed
2000), 9B U.L.A. 378. The Act was further promulgated to "fulfill an important social need
in terms of improving the states' systems of support enforcement." Id., 9B U.L.A. 380.
Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wyoming have adopted the UPA (1973). Id. tbl. (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377
(2001). The Act was amended in 2000 because widely differing treatment on subjects not
dealt with by the Act, such as determination of parentage after a divorce and scientific
advances in reproduction, was common. Id. prefatory n., 9B U.L.A.297. Texas has adopted
this version of the Act. Id. tbl. (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A.2 (Supp. 2002).
221
222

See infra Part III.D.1.
ABA MODEL ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. ACT §§ 1.01-1.11 (1999) at http://www.abanet.

The Model Assisted Reproductive
org/ftp/ pub/family/ modelassistedreptech.doc.
Technologies Act was drafted by the Committee on the Laws of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies and Genetics in December, 1999. The discussion draft has not yet been
approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the ABA and,
accordingly, should not be construed as representing the policy of the ABA.
m See infra Part III.D.2.
224
22

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4), 9B U.L.A. 303.

Id. § 102(4)(A)-(E), 9B U.L.A. 303.
226 Id. art. 7, 9B U.L.A. 354.
227 Id. § 701 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 354,
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the UPA does not apply. 22 If a child is conceived as the result of assisted
reproduction, section 702 clarifies that a Snprm nr tc, rtnn r iz nr+n
parent of the resulting child. 229 However, the term "donor" does not
include a husband who provides sperm for use by his wife, who also
provides her own eggs, in assisted reproduction. 230 The wife is the
child's mother under section 201(a)(1) by virtue of giving birth to the
child, and, if the husband has consented to the assisted reproduction, he
is the child's father under section 201(b)(5). 231
The UPA also addresses the situation in which the husband dies
before his wife undergoes assisted reproduction-he is not the legal
father of any posthumously conceived child unless there is a record of
his consent to be the father of such child. 232 In cases where consent is
lacking, the child would have a legal mother and a genetic, but not legal,
father. The committee that drafted the UPA ("UPA Committee")
suggested that this section was "designed primarily to avoid the
problems of intestate succession which could arise if the posthumous use
of a person's genetic material could lead to the deceased being
determined to be a parent." 233 The UPA Committee further stated that a

Id. § 701, 9B U.L.A. 354. UPA Article 8 provides guidelines for children conceived as a
result of surrogate, or gestational, agreements. Id. art. 8, 9B U.L.A. 360.
29
Id. § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355. Donors are in essence eliminated from the parental
equation because "[tihe donor can neither sue to establish parental rights, nor be sued and
required to support the resulting child." Id. The comment to this provision explains that
the UPA "does not deal with many of the complex and serious legal problems raised by the
practice of assisted reproduction. Issues such as ownership and disposition of embryos,
regulation of the medical procedures, insurance coverage, etc., are left to other statutes or
common law." Id.
I-, Id. § 102(8)(a), 9B U.L.A. 304. The term also does not include a woman who gives
birth to a child through assisted reproduction. Id.
Id. § 201, 9B U.L.A. 309. This point is emphasized in section 703, which states that a
231
husband who provides sperm for use by his wife in assisted reproduction is the father of
any resulting child. Id. § 703, 9B U.L.A. 356. Moreover, even if the husband merely
consents to assisted reproduction by his wife, even if his sperm is not used, he is presumed
to be the father of a child born to the wife by this means. Id. § 703 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 356. To
be effective, the husband's consent must be in a record signed by both the woman and her
husband. Id. § 704, 9B U.L.A. 356. If a husband does not consent to assisted reproduction,
he may nonetheless be found to be the father of a resulting child if he and his wife openly
treat the child as their own. Id. § 704(b), 9B U.L.A. 356.
232 Id. § 707, 9B U.L.A. 358. Similarly, when a husband and wife have entered into an
agreement for the use of assisted reproduction and the marriage is dissolved, before
implantation, the former husband is not the legal parent of a child resulting from assisted
reproduction unless the agreement contains his consent to the post-divorce use of his
sperm. Id. § 706, 9B U.L.A. 358.
233 Id. § 707 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 359.
28
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spouse who wished to provide for posthumously conceived children
234
could do so in his or her will.
Although the UPA attempts to address the issues that arise from
posthumous conception, it does not adequately serve the interests of all
the concerned parties. The UPA does not solve the problem that arises
when a father consents to posthumous reproduction but does not
provide for the child in his will. Prohibiting unintentionally excluded
children from collecting support from their biological father's estate
would be against their best interests. Furthermore, the provision fails to
address the interests of the deceased parent and those involved in the
administration of the estate. Therefore, a more comprehensive scheme is
needed.
2.

Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act

In 1999, the ABA Committee on the Laws of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies and Genetics proposed a model act in attempt to "give
ART patients, participants, parents, and providers clear legal rights and
protections." 235 The model act precludes a posthumous child from

234 Id.
235 ABA

MODEL

ASSISTED

REPROD.

TECHS.

ACT

purpose

stint.

(1999)

at

http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/family/modelassistedreptech.doc. The purpose of the
Act is as follows:
Since the birth of the world's first IVF baby in 1978, extraordinary
advances in reproductive medicine have made biological parenthood
possible for many individuals suffering from infertility, other medical
illness or diseases, or those at risk for passing on inherited illnesses or
genetic disabilities.
Such advances have also been applied (or
proposed) to extend reproductive potential, such as for treating postmenopausal women or cloning. The new technologies and treatments,
including the use of third parties to assist in creation or gestation of an
embryo, have also created a host of novel legal issues, including the
very real possibility of a child being born with up to six potential
parents.
Because of the great, but intangible value of creating and rearing
a child, and the unique physical, psychological, and legal issues raised
by Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART), this Act seeks to give
ART patients, participants, parents, and providers clear legal rights
and protections. The Act also seeks to protect the rights of children
conceived through the ARTs, and to establish legal standards for the
donation, use, storage, and disposition of gametes and embryos,
including cryopreserved gametes and embryos. The Act also address
[sic] societal concerns about the ARTs, such as providing insurance
coverage for ARTs that is comparable to coverage for treatments of
similar conditions. The Act further attempts to clarify standards for
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inheriting unless the embryo transfer occurred prior to the death of the
intended parent, or the intended parent execited a will consenting to
inheritance. 236 It also provides that a child must be born within three
years of the death of the intended parent for that child to be considered
an heir.

237

A three-year statute of limitations recognizes the concerns
surrounding the timely settlement of estates because the child would
2
have to be born within the period already required by the UPC.3
However, it does not truly consider the interests of all parties involved in
estate administration. If the estate was settled and closed before the
three-year deadline, the estate would have to be reopened in order to
distribute a share to a posthumously conceived child. A period of
limitations less than three years and closer to the period of time during
which claims are allowed to be brought against the estate, therefore,
would seem more appropriate. However, the application of a one-year

informed consent, statistical reporting requirements,
advertising, and quality assurance standards.
Id.
2m

truth

in

Id. § 1.07. Section 1.07 states:
Subd. 1. In the absence of a testamentary document executed by an
intended parent, the following principles apply:
(a) If an intended parent dies before embryo transfer, the resulting
child has no rights against the estate of that intended parent.
(b) If one or both intended parents die at any time during the
pregnancy of a gestational carrier, the resulting child is an heir of both
intended parents.
(c) If an intended parent dies after storage of gametes, or creation or
storage of an embryo(s), but before the time of transfer of gametes or
embryo(s), then the resulting child is not the heir of the deceased
intended parent.
(d) If one or both intended parents die after the transfer of an
embryo(s) or gametes, but before birth of the child, the resulting child
is an heir of both intended parents.
Subd. 2. A child resulting from assisted conception is not an heir of a
donor.
Subd. 3. A donor has no rights against the child or the child's estate.
Id. Embryo transfer is the method of transferring or placing an embryo into the body of "a
woman intended to gestate the embryo, with the intent to achieve live birth of a child." Id.
§ 1.01, Subd. 9. An intended parent is "an individual or couple, married or unmarried,
who enter into a written or oral agreement with a donor, or gestational carrier, under this
Act providing that they intend to be legally bound as the parent of a child or children born
through assisted conception." Id. § 1.01, Subd. 13.
-7 Id. § 1.05, Subd. 1(c)(5) ("No child born more than three years following the death of
an intended parent may be considered that individual's legal child.").
m See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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statute of limitations could pose significant burdens on the surviving
spouse, who would be required to make the decision to bear the child of
her deceased spouse while still in the midst of grieving.239 A one-year
period would also necessitate the quick success of conception
attempts. 240
Imposing a notice requirement could resolve this problem. If the
surviving spouse were required to notify the deceased spouse's estate
within a year of his or her intent to reproduce using the deceased
spouse's preserved gametes, then the resulting child's share could be
held in statutory trust until his or her birth.241 Then applying a threeyear statute of limitations to the birth of the child would be more
reasonable, as it would consider both the timeliness of estate
administration and the likely success of conception. If the surviving
spouse is unsuccessful in his or her attempts at conception, then the
share that had been set aside for the resulting child could be distributed
to the heirs upon the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations.
The surviving heirs would then not risk dilution of their shares by a
posthumously conceived child, but would only stand to gain a larger
share if no child is born. However, the three-year statute of limitations
should be subject to a reasonableness standard. For example, a child
who is scheduled to be born within the statutory period according to the
mother's due date but who is born one week later should be allowed to
inherit.
The ABA's model act also requires binding written agreements as to
the use and disposition of the embryos in the event of divorce, death, or
other change in circumstances. 242 It further provides that if, subsequent

239 Woodward v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 268 (2002). The Woodward court
decided to leave the resolution of the time constraints surrounding inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children to "the appropriate case, should one arise." Id.
240 Id. at 268; see also supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (discussing the time limitations on
bringing claims against the estate); see also Shapo, supranote 86, at 1155.
242 ABA MODEL ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. ACT § 1.05, Subd. 1(a). Section 1.05 states:
(a) Prior to embryo creation, binding written agreements must be
entered into by all participants as to:
(1) their intended use and disposition of the embryos;
(2) the use and disposition of the embryos in the event of
divorce, illness, death or other change of circumstances; and
(3) the time at which, and conditions under which, embryos will
be deemed abandoned and the disposition thereof.
Id. A "written authorization" must include the following:
(a) Is written in plain language.
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to a written agreement, there is a dispute and a divorce, then the parent
whn wi hes to use the embryo to create a child may do u, but the nonconsenting parent will not be granted any parental rights. 243 However,
while the mere storage of sperm or eggs should not be enough to
establish intent, a more flexible standard that would permit oral
244
declarations of intent should be allowed in certain circumstances.

(b) Is dated and signed by the individual.
(c) Describes the nature of the treatment, including medical, legal, and
psychological risks.
(d) Includes an embryo disposition agreement pursuant to Section 1.05
of this Act.
(e) Includes the mental health counseling notice as provided in Section
1.03 of this Act.
(f) Includes a written agreement clarifying legal parental rights if
collaborative reproduction is used pursuant to Section 1.06 of this Act.
(g) States that disclosures have been given pursuant to this Act.
(h) Includes contact information for storage of embryos pursuant to
Section 1.05 of this Act.
(i) Includes contact information for the donor registry pursuant to
Section 1.09 of this Act.
(j) Specifies the length of time the authorization shall remain valid.
(k) Advises the person signing the authorization of the right to receive
a copy of the authorization.
Id. § 1.02, Subd. 3. The model act further provides, "It shall be unlawful to collect gametes
or embryos from a deceased person for any reason, without a written testamentary
document executed by an intended parent pursuant to section 1.07 of this Act." Id. § 1.02,
Subd. 6.
243 Id. § 1.05, Subd. 1(c)(4). This provision states:
In the event of a subsequent disagreement between intended parents,
wherein one intended parent no longer wishes to use stored embryos
to create a child as previously agreed, following a divorce or in the
event of non-married embryo creators, that intended parent may use
the embryos to create a child as previously agreed; however, the nonconsenting intended parent will not be considered a legal parent of any
resulting child and will have no parental rights or obligations to any
resulting child.
Id.
244 See Bailey, supra note 1, at 793. While discussing pretermission, Bailey states:
The simple fact that the testator took the unusual step of cryogenically
preserving his or her reproductive material could be seen as an
indication of the intention by the testator that the eventual
posthumous child receive a share from the estate. If so, then it seems
unlikely that a court would conclude that the testator desired to
disinherit a product of the cryogenically preserved material. However,
...many people forget that the reproductive material is in storage. If a
testator specifically devises reproductive material but does not include
a testamentary provision for potential offspring from that material, a
court could reasonably reach two contrary conclusions: either that the
testator deliberately excluded such children, or that the testator's
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Some courts already admit oral declarations as evidence of intent in
other situations, including those in which there is an ambiguity in a
will.245 For instance, declarations that clearly show intent to become a
posthumous parent made under impending death should be permitted.
The above proposals provide a starting point in balancing the
interests of the state in the timely administration of estates and the
interests of the posthumously conceived child and his or her deceased
natural parent. The following proposed amendment addresses the need
for consideration of these interests by allowing posthumously conceived
children to inherit when there is clear intent and when they are born
within a certain period of time.
IV.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

Courts can continue to make ad hoc decisions, looking to the
imperfectly designed model acts and a growing body of case law for
guidance in light of modem ARTs, or "the Legislature can act to impose
a broader order which, even though it might not be perfect on a case-bycase basis, would bring some predictability to those who seek to make
use of artificial reproductive techniques." 246 By adopting the following
statutory framework, states could protect both the interests of the
posthumously conceived child as well as the interests of third parties.
§ 2-114. Parent and Child Relationship
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d), for
purposes of intestate succession by, through, or from a
person, an individual conceived during the lifetime of his or
her natural parents is the child of his or her natural
parents, regardless of their marital status. The parent
and child relationship may be established under [the

mention of them in the will implied a desire to treat them as any other
children. The inherent ambiguity in such actions strains theoretical
foundations of pretermission statutes designed for less complex
situations.
Id.
245
Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting from Scriveners' Errors: The Argument
for Reformation, 40 CATH.U. L. REV. 1,17 (1990). "When a will is the product of malfeasance
or fraudulent representation, not only is evidence of the testator's surroundings and
circumstances admissible, but also evidence of the testator's oral or written declarations of
intention or affection." Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (1998).
246

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss1/7

Vegter: The "Art" of Inheritance: A Proposal for Legislation Requiring Pr

2003]

"ART" of Inheritance
Uniform Parentage Act] [applicable state law] [insert
appropriate statutory reference].
(b) An adopted individual is the child of his [or her]
adopting parent or parents and not of his [or her]
natural parents, but adoption of a child by the spouse of
either natural parent has no effect on (i) the relationship
between the child and that natural parent or (ii) the right
of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit from
or through the other natural parent.
(c) An individual conceived after the death of one or both
natural parents is a child of the deceased natural parent(s)
only if (i) the circumstances clearly and convincingly establish
that the deceased natural parent(s) intended to be a
posthumous parent(s) and (ii) the individual who wishes to
use the deceased's gametes notifies the estate of his or her
intentions within one year of the death of the natural parent
and the child is born within three years of the death of the
naturalparent.
(d) Inheritance from or through a child by either natural
parent or his [or her] kindred is precluded unless that
natural parent has openly treated the child as his [or
247
hers], and has not refused to support the child.

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (amended 1990), 8.1 U.L.A. 91 (2001) (alterations in
original) (author's contribution in italics).
247
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Comment
Subsection (a) sets forth the general rule that for purposes of
intestate succession, a child is the child of his or her natural parents,
regardless of their marital status. 248
Because a new subsection
addressing posthumously conceived children is proposed, the phrase
"conceived during the lifetime of his or her natural parents" is added to
distinguish the general rule from the exception.
Subsection (b) contains an exception to the general rule, but it
remains unchanged because the inheritance rights of adopted children
249
are beyond the scope of this Note.
Subsection (c) contains a second exception to the general rule.
Subsection (c) states the rule that, for inheritance purposes, a
posthumously conceived child is the child of his or her deceased natural
parent under certain circumstances. First, the deceased natural parent
must have, during his or her lifetime, unequivocally manifested his or
her intent to have and support a posthumous child. This intent may be
either express or implied, but it must be clear and convincing. 25° Clear
and convincing evidence is:
evidence by a credible witness whose memory of the
facts about which he testifies is distinct, whose narration
of the details is exact and in due order, and whose
testimony is so direct, weighty, and convincing as to
enable the fact-finder to come to a clear conviction,
251
without hesitance, of the truth of the facts related.
For example, an individual's death-bed declaration of intent that his or
her preserved reproductive materials be used to conceive a child even
after his or her death should be allowed. Second, the surviving
individual must notify the administrator of the estate of his or her desire

248 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 cmt., 8.1 U.L.A. 91; see also Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 26162 (1978) (upholding a New York statute that required nonmarital children to provide a
judicial order of paternity in order to inherit from their fathers by intestate succession).
249 For a proposed amendment to the act pertaining to committed partners, see Susan N.
Gary, The Parent-ChildRelationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REv. 643, 684-85
(2002).
2-0 See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text (discussing the intent found in Hecht
(express) and Kolacy (implied)).
251 United States v. Jepsen, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1036 (W.D. Ark. 2002) (quoting Bishop v.
Bishop, 961 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998)).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss1/7

Vegter: The "Art" of Inheritance: A Proposal for Legislation Requiring Pr

2003]

"ART" of Inheritance

313

to use the deceased's sperm or eggs to conceive a child within one year
from death.252 This subsection is subject to a standard of reasonableness.
To illustrate, consider the hypothetical situation proposed at the
beginning of this Note. John has two children from a previous marriage.
Mary, his widow, conceives a child through ART using John's frozen
sperm twenty-seven months after his death. Sarah, the biological child
of John and Mary, is born nearly three years after the death of her father.
With respect to subsection (c)(i), consider three variations:
Variation 1: The only proof Mary has that John intended to have a
child is that he deposited his sperm at the fertility clinic. In this case,
Sarah would not be entitled to a share of the estate because the deposit of
sperm2 3or eggs alone is not enough to establish intent under subsection
(C)(i). 1
Variation 2: Although there is no documented evidence that John
intended to have a posthumous child, minutes before he died he told
Mary and the relatives standing nearby that he wished for her to
conceive his child after his death. In this situation, John's intent may be
reasonably inferred from the circumstances, and Sarah would be entitled
to a share of her father's estate if Mary complied with subsection (c)(ii) of
this provision. 254
Variation 3: When he deposited his sperm at the fertility clinic, John
asked that a letter be included in his file that stated his intentions that if
he were to die before Mary could become pregnant, she would still use
the stored samples to conceive his child. Here there is express written
evidence of John's intent to become a posthumous parent. 25 Therefore,
Sarah would be entitled to a share of her father's estate if Mary complied
with subsection (c)(ii) of this provision.
With respect to subsection (c)(ii), consider three variations:
Variation 1: Within a year after John's death, Mary notified the estate
that she wished to use John's sperm to conceive a child. Sarah was
expected to be born before but was born one week after the three-year
statute of limitations. In this case, if Sarah is born after her due date,

See supra notes 173-76, 241 and accompanying text.
253 See supranote 244 and accompanying text.
25 See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
252
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which would have fallen within the statute of limitations, and Mary
complies with the notice requirement, reasonableness would dictate that
Sarah would be entitled to a share of her father's estate if there was
evidence of John's intent under subsection (c)(i) of this provision.
Variation 2: Mary failed to notify John's estate of her intent to use his
sperm to conceive a child. Sarah was expected to be born before but was
born one week after the three-year statute of limitations. Although
subject to a standard of reasonableness, if Mary failed to comply with the
notice provision, the state's interest in the final settlement of the estate
outweighs Sarah's interest. Therefore, Sarah would not be entitled to a
share of her father's estate, even if there was evidence of his intent under
subsection (c)(i) of this provision.
Variation3: Within a year after John's death, Mary notified the estate
that she wished to use John's sperm to conceive a child. Sarah was not
expected to be born until one week after the three-year statute of
limitations, but Mary notified the estate that she was pregnant. In this
situation, the probate court would have to consider the reasons why
Mary could not comply with the statute of limitations. If, for example,
she had been trying to conceive but was not successful until now,
reasonableness would dictate that Sarah would be entitled to a share of
her father's estate if there was evidence of John's intent under subsection
(c)(i) of this provision and if Mary complied with the notice
requirements. If, on the other hand, Mary failed to notify the estate
within one year of John's death, the state's interest in the final settlement
of the estate would outweigh Sarah's interest.
As illustrated, the proposed amendment to UPC § 2-114 attempts to
solve the imbalance of parental, child, and estate administration
interests. By failing to acknowledge the interests of all the parties
affected when posthumously conceived children wish to take a part of
the deceased parent's estate, the existing proposals do not provide the
comprehensive legislative scheme that is necessary to address these
complex issues. Consequently, the existing law must change with
technology.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the years to come, more posthumously conceived children like
Sarah will be born. Cases involving these children and their right to
inherit from the deceased parent will become more common, unless the
Current laws are
rights of these children are addressed today.
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inadequate for dealing with the inheritance rights of these children.
Their best interests, specifically their interest in parental support, should
not be outweighed by the state's interest in the timely administration of
estates. Likewise, these interests should not outweigh the deceased
parent's intent. Just as there is a fundamental right to procreate, there is
a fundamental right not to procreate, so individuals should not be forced
to become posthumous parents. The amendment to the UPC proposed
by this Note considers the harmonization of these interests, and thus
imposes a clear and convincing determination of the deceased's intent as
well as statute of limitations under which a posthumously conceived
child may make a claim against his or her deceased parent's estate. The
proposed amendment serves as a tool for state legislatures, because as
ARTs advance and more posthumously conceived children are born, the
law must adapt.
Melissa B. Vegter*
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